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WAR AND THE DOUBTFUL SOLDIER
MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON*
INTRODUCTION
When one speaks about the morality or immorality of a mili-
tary campaign, almost inevitably in the same breath the legality
of that action is addressed. Opponents of military action fre-
quendy charge that the use of American forces would be
immoral because it is illegal. Further, the test by which modern
religious figures and ethicists measure the morality of military
action-the just war theory-looks at the legal authority for wag-
ing the war,' and parallels international legal restrictions on the
proper conduct of armed warfare.2 To a large extent, the moral-
ity and legality of military conflict are two intertwined concepts.
As Catholic Priest, Navy Chaplain, and later Cardinal, John J.
O'Connor once posited: "[I] n our American tradition the just
war (that is, the morally 'right' war) is the lawful war; the lawful
war is the just war."'
* L.L.M. (Military Law), The Judge Advocate General's School; L.L.M.
(Government Procurement Law), George Washington University Law School;
J.D., College of William & Mary; B.S., United States Military Academy. The
author is a retired Army officer, candidate for the S.J.D. degree at George
Washington University Law School, and an attorney with the Department of
Treasury. The opinions contained herein are those of the author and do not
represent the position of the Departments of the Army, Treasury, or any other
federal agency. Further, the author wishes to thank LTC Jody Prescott for his
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. RICHARDJ. REGAN, JUST WAR PRINCIPLES AND CASES 84 (1996) ("Just war
theory requires that those who make decisions to wage war should be constitu-
tionally and legally authorized to do so .. ").
2. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND PRESBYTERIAN PEACEMAKING
PROGRAM PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), PRESBYrERIANS AND MILITARY SERVICE:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (2002), http://www.pcusa.org/oga/publications/
military-service.pdf (outlining that "[t]he traditional teaching of the church,
which has been adopted by and incorporated in international law, includes cri-
teria for deciding to go to war and rules for limiting the conduct of the war")
(on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinaf-
ter PRESBYTERIANS AND MILITARY SERVICE]. The international law of armed con-
flict traces its roots, in part, to the just war doctrine. See YORUM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 61 (3d ed. 2001) (During the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries "the fathers of international law ... imported into the new
international legal system the well-established religious (Catholic) doctrine that
only a just war is permissible.").
3. JOHNJ. O'CONNOR, A CHAPLAIN LOOKS AT VIETNAM 11 (1968)
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For those members of the American military tasked to fight
it, the war's characterization as just or unjust is particularly signif-
icant. America's military is largely a religious one. Service mem-
bers go into battle carrying holy books and religious symbols of
their faith,4 and one of the few critical items of information listed
on identification (dog) tags is the service member's religion.
The armed forces have their own Chaplain's Corps, composed of
representatives of numerous religions.5 Held in high esteem
within the military, chaplains share many of the hardships associ-
ated with military life and accompany military units on deploy-
ments and into combat zones.6 Indeed, many chaplains have
made the ultimate sacrifice while serving in the military;7 and
chaplains have been the recipient of our nation's highest award
for valor, the Congressional Medal of Honor.'
4. See Bill Broadway, Troops Find Faith in Things They Carry, WASH. POST,
Mar. 29, 2003, at Bi ("Thousands of the U.S. soldiers in Iraq are carrying con-
crete symbols of their faith .... "); see also Nick Adde, There Are No Atheists in
Foxholes, ARMY TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at 37, 38 (noting that Chaplains were
purchasing camouflage Bibles for soldiers and Marines deployed to the Persian
Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield).
5. See Stephan Manning, Chaplains Help U.S. Military Accommodate Muslim
Recruits, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at Bi (pointing out that "more than 250
religious denominations are represented in the U.S. military").
6. See, e.g., Ron Martz, GIs Find Sanctuary in Desert Of Kuwait, ATLANTA J.
AND CONSTITUTION, Dec. 14, 2002, at 1 (reporting on a Presbyterian Chaplain
ministering to Army soldiers in Kuwait); Gayle White, Chaplains: Soldiers' Mrale
Is 'Quite Good, ATLANTAJ. CONSTITUTION, Apr. 15, 1999, at A20 ("About 70 Air
Force chaplains are deployed with troops in Bosnia and nearby countries
because of the Kosovo operation .... ");JAMES D. JOHNSON, COMBAT CHAPLAIN:
A THIRTY-YEAR VIETNAM BATTLE (2001) (detailing the service of a Baptist chap-
lain with a combat unit in Vietnam).
7. See Adde, supra note 4, at 37 (Navy Chaplain Williams Thomas Cum-
mings, a Catholic priest, "was killed Dec. 15, 1944, when a torpedo from an
American submarine sank the unmarked Japanese transport ship that carried
him and other American prisoners of war."); see also Catholic Chaplains Killed in
Wartime to Be Honored, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 20, 1989, at 41A ("Seventy
priests were killed in World War II, six in Korea, and seven in Vietnam."); RoB-
ERT L. GUSHWA, THE BEST AND THE WORST OF TIMES: THE UNITED STATES ARMY
CIAPLAINCY 1920-1945, at 41, 141 (The U.S. Army Chaplaincy, vol. 4, 1977)
(noting that twenty-three chaplains were killed in World War I while sixty-three
were killed in action in World War II and an additional 273 wounded in
action). During World War II, "[t]he Chaplain branch was third in combat
deaths on a percentage basis, behind the Air Forces and the Infantry." See id. at
141.
8. Father Angelo Liteky earned the Medal of Honor during his first tour
of duty in Vietnam. The chaplain was "credited with saving the lives of twenty
wounded men at the repeated risk of his own, pulling them practically out of
the teeth of an enemy machinegun nest." See LEwis SORLEY, THUNDERBOLT:
GENERAL CREIGHTON ABRAMS AND THE ARMY OF HIS TIMES 293 (1992). Liteky
was wounded during his second tour in Vietnam and eventually left both the
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The vast majority of service members describe themselves as
practicing members of a religion, with over three-fourths of the
armed forces declaring themselves to be Christians.9 When faced
with the prospect of being sent in harm's way, those service mem-
bers who practice a faith anchor to it and many who had not
previously joined an organized religion do so, seeking the spiri-
tual comfort that religious faith provides."0 The religious procliv-
ity within the armed forces exists not only in the ranks, but also
extends throughout the highest levels of the military. As an illus-
tration, General Creighton Abrams, who eventually commanded
the American effort in Vietnam and rose to become the Army's
Chief of Staff, converted to Catholicism while assigned to Viet-
nam.1 Further, General George S. Patton, Jr., the profane and
pugnacious World War II commander, was devoutly religious and
reportedly read the Bible daily. 2
Beyond purely religious considerations, America's warriors
want, and perhaps even need, to believe in the justness of their
cause. Military commanders must bear the heavy burden of
Army and the priesthood. Id.; see also VIETNAM-THE NAMES, THE DEEDS 51
(The Congressional Medal of Honor Library, 1984) (describing how Navy chap-
lain Vincent Capodanno, while subject to enemy fire, continued to assist
wounded Marines and administered last rites despite his own wounds, until
killed in action); id. at 218-19 (noting how Army chaplain Charles Watters car-
ried several wounded soldiers to safety, assisted the wounded, and administered
last rites until killed in action).
9. Most in Armed Forces Are Religious, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at ClI
("Nearly half of Americans serving in the armed forces identify themselves as
Protestant, and one-fourth as Roman Catholic .... "). Of the approximately
eighty percent of the armed forces who identified themselves with a particular
religion, the Defense Department figures were as follows: "Protestant, 573,262;
Catholic, 313,628; Muslim, 4,158; Jewish, 3,988; Buddhist, 2,519; Orthodox,
1,490; and Hindu, 437." Id.
10. See Andrew Cawthorne, Battlefield Baptism, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003,
at AL, A12 ("For many of the 132,000 American soldiers occupying Iraq, relig-
ion is an important solace as they face loneliness, hardship and the possibility of
losing their lives."); see also jay Lindsay, Army Chaplains' Pack Provides First-Aid Kit
for Soldiers' Souls, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2001, at B8 ("When you're fearing your
mortality and bullets are flying, people get real religious," said a Protestant
chaplain.); Adde, supra note 4, at 38 ("The bottom line is soldiers know they
may die. They want to prepare for eternity, and chaplains can help . . .");
Gus,-IA, supra note 7, at 178 (World War II chaplains reported that "religious
teachings that men already had embraced was a source of strength, and the
time of peril made more dramatic their calling upon them."); Keeping The Faith,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at Al (Photo Insert) ("U.S. Marines of the First
Marine Expeditionary Force attended Sunday church services yesterday at
Camp Iwo Jima in Kuwait as war looms over the Persian Gulf region.").
11. SORLEY, supra note 8, at 298 (In 1970, Abrams left Vietnam to join his
family in Thailand for the baptism.).
12. HARRY H. SEMMES, PORTRAIT OF PATrON 6-7 (1955).
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sending their subordinates into hostile situations knowing that
death, maiming, or other serious injury may result. Individual
combatants, who struggle with and must overcome their natural
moral aversion to killing another human being, seek justification
for their actions.13 A belief in the justness of the military cam-
paign sustains the soldiers' willingness to bear the heavy burdens
and sacrifices associated with combat.14
Further, as Vietnam so clearly illustrated, in a democratic
society the national leadership must obtain and maintain public
support for military actions, particularly prolonged ones, or risk
eventual military defeat regardless of its achievements on the bat-
tlefield.1" As the former Army Chief of Staff, General Fred C.
Weyand, posited: " [W] hen the American people lose their com-
mitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the
final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the
Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people."16
Accordingly, for the American military, a belief in the justness of
military action is critical.
Not surprisingly, large-scale domestic anti-war protests can
undermine public support for a military campaign and concomi-
tantly adversely affect the morale of America's fighting forces by
causing soldiers to question the legitimacy of their participa-
tion 17 or by interfering with their social support network at
13. See Major Peter Kilner, Military Leader's Obligation to Justify Killing in
War, MIL. REv., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 24. Major Kilner posits that, in order to help
soldiers deal with the moral repercussions of killing, military leaders have an
obligation to morally justify such killings to their subordinates. Id.
14. See LTC (RET.) LAWRENCE P. CROCKER, ARMY OFFICER'S GUIDE 23
(46th ed. 1993) ("[Elxperienced military leaders know that officers and soldiers
fight more courageously and sacrifice more willingly when they hold a deep
conviction as to the worthwhileness and the justice of the cause for which they
fight."); see also GEN. S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE 162 (1947) ("Those
who respect history will deem it beyond argument that belief in a cause is the
foundation of the aggressive will in battle.").
15. See generally COL. HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., ON STRATEGY- A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1982) (providing a thoughtful analysis of the
reasons for the American defeat in Vietnam).
16. Id. at 11; see also MARSHALL, supra note 14, at 28 ("[A]I military power
is dependent on the civil will. It is the nation and not its army which makes
war.").
17. See M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Protests Disturb Soldiers at Front, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2003, at A17 ("[S]ome say they take the anti-war protests personally,
questioning the jobs they do and their boss, President Bush."); see also GUENTER
LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 159 (1978) ("Disenchantment with the Vietnam war
on the part of the media, 'peace' demonstrations and antiwar statements on the
part of prominent public officials could not but create a climate of doubt and
lack of sense of purpose which posed a severe challenge to dedication and
discipline.").
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home. 8 Similarly, pronouncements by religious leaders chal-
lenging the justness of the cause may also have an adverse impact
on those going into harm's way, both directly and indirectly. 9 At
no time in our history was the power of protest felt more acutely
by the military than during the Vietnam War.
2 °
The controversy surrounding the invasion of Iraq by the
United States and its allies generated debates about whether the
invasion constituted a 'just war." Major religious figures played a
prominent, and very public, role in that debate. Religious oppo-
nents of the pending invasion, and subsequent military opera-
tions, appeared in television advertisements,21 participated in
peace marches, 22 passed resolutions, 2' held public prayer vigils,
24
18. See LT. COL. DAVID GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST
OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIE'Y 277 (1996) (During Vietnam, antiwar
sentiment contributed to soldiers' "psychological and social isolation from
home and society. . . ."). Further, inadequate social support systems can lead
to long-term psychological injuries in combat veterans. Id. at 277 ("Numerous
psychological studies have found that the social support system-or lack
thereof-upon returning from combat is a critical factor in the veteran's psy-
chological health."); id. at 278 ("[A]n argument can be made that psychological
casualties can be impacted by public disapproval.").
19. Frank Schaeffer, Stripped of Spiritual Comfort, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003,
at B7 (arguing that anti-war declarations by religious leaders deprive the par-
ents of service members of "spiritual comfort").
20. To the extent there may be limits on appropriate protests in a demo-
cratic society, some critics charge-rightfully so-that the boundaries of appro-
priate discourse were exceeded by various members of antiwar protest
community. See SUMMERS, supra note 15, at 26 (Anti-war protestors "too often
raised [their voices] in support of our enemies," encouraged soldiers to disobey
orders, and focused their "anti-war sentiment" on the Army itself; "[b]y attack-
ing the executors of U.S. Vietnam policy rather than the makers of that policy, the
protestors were striking at the very heart of our democratic system-the civilian
control of the military.") (emphasis in original); see also GROSSMAN, supra note
18, at 278 ("Often [emotionally vulnerable Vietnam] veterans were verbally
abused and physically attacked or even spit upon.").
21. Alan Cooperman, Church Leaders Propose Anti War Plan, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8, 2003, at Al5 (The "ecumenical officer of the United Methodist Counsel
of Bishops .. .previously appeared in television ads criticizing the administra-
tion's march toward war.").
22. Arlo Wagner, Mayor, Bush Feel Heat From Celebrators, WASH. TIMES, June
21, 2003, at BI, B2 (Photo Insert).
23. Henry G. Brinton, Can Christians Back This War?, WASH. POST, Sept.
29, 2002, at B4 (The National Capital Presbytery, a regional body of the Presby-
terian Church, "passed a resolution opposing military action against Iraq at this
time. At a recent World Council of Churches central committee meeting,
thirty-seven church leaders signed a statement urging restraint.").
24. Larry Witham, Clergy Set Hill Vigil Against Iraq War, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2003, at A5.
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and met with or sent messages to American and allied leaders.2 5
The Bush administration viewed the Vatican's skepticism seri-
ously enough to send envoys to meet with Catholic officials, both
before and after the invasion, to convince them that the war was
just.2
6
Interestingly, while a large number of religious leaders chal-
lenged the justness of the war, in contrast the majority of their
congregations initially supported it.2 7 The most pronounced dis-
agreements between the clergy and their congregations occurred
"among Catholics and many 'mainline' Protestants .... 28 In
comparison, the smallest chasm between clergy and laity existed
within the Southern Baptist Convention.2 9 Generally, both the
leadership and laity of conservative evangelical and Pentecostal
churches supported military action against Iraq."° Further, even
25. Bill Sammon, Bush Discounts Pope's Anti-war Plea, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2003, at A4 (reporting that President Bush met with the papal envoy, who
presented the President with a letter from the Pope expressing moral concerns
about attacking Iraq); Bill Broadway, Religious Leaders' Voices Rise on Iraq, WASH.
POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at BI1 (noting that "[s]everal major U.S. religious organi-
zations have written letters to the White House opposing the president's call for
a preemptive strike against Iraq . . . [and that forty-nine] Catholic, Protestant
and Orthodox Christian leaders" sent a letter to the President and members of
his administration discouraging an attack on Iraq); see also Caryle Murphy,
Church Leaders to Voice War Opposition to Blair, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2003, at B8
(reporting that a delegation of United States church leaders was to meet with
the British Prime Minister to oppose the invasion of Iraq).
26. James Dao, War on Iraq Was Just, Powell Says to Pope, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2003, at A13; Larry Witham, U.S. Taking Its Case for War to Vatican, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2003, at All.
27. Robert S. McCain, Clerics, Laity Disagree, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at
A2 ("Antiwar rhetoric rings from many U.S. pulpits, but the people in the pews
support President Bush's policy in Iraq."). Further, polls indicated that those
Americans who regularly attended church were more likely to support military
operations against Iraq than those Americans who did not attend religious ser-
vices. Mark Tooley, Faith in Bush, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at A23.
28. McCain, supra note 27, at A2 (The mainline Protestant denomina-
tions included Methodists, Episcopalians, and Lutherans.).
29. Id.; see also Rev. Glenn Moorman, Scripture Justifies 'A Season'for Both
Just War and Peace, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003 (supporting the President).
30. See Laurie Goodstein, Diverse Denominations Oppose the Call to Arms, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A12 ("There is support for a war among some leaders of
large ministries, and of conservative evangelical and Pentacostal churches but
little that is organized."); McCain, supra note 27, at A2 (noting that seventy-
seven percent of white evangelicals favored taking military action against Iraq);
Broadway, supra note 25, at Bll ("IT]he president also has received support
from leaders of the fastest-growing segment of religion in the United States-
evangelical Christianity.").
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some who questioned the justness of the initial invasion, never-
theless conceded that it was fought justly.3 '
Two particularly unsettling events occurred during the latest
Gulf War. First, the Bishop of the Roman Byzantine Catholic
Church, reportedly issued a letter positing: "Any participation in
and support of this war against the people of Iraq is objectively
grave evil, a matter of mortal sin . . *"32 Further, the letter
declared that the military campaign did not meet the standards
of a just war, that "any killing associated with it is unjustified and,
in consequence, unequivocally murder," and concluded by for-
bidding direct participation in the war. 3
Second, in response, the Archbishop of the Archdiocese for
the Military Services issued a letter to military Catholics assuring
them that they could participate in the war.3 4 However, in a sub-
sequent statement the Archdiocese posited that "the Magiste-
rium (teaching authority) of the Church has the right and even
duty in cases in which an unjust war is proposed or entered into
to speak on the matter and if necessary, to obligate Catholics in
conscience to object and refuse to participate."3' Notwithstanding
the criticism of the war by several Catholic leaders, the Church
had "stopped short of insisting upon a course of action for
Catholics in the military."3 6 Such public pronouncements by
religious leaders against the war, particularly those forbidding
participation, raise the issue as to the proper role of religious
31. See Cheryl K. Chumley, War Seen As in Line with Christian View, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at A13 ("Opponents of the military campaign, such as
Rep. Jesse L. Jackson Uunior] ... said the administration's concerns for the
lives of innocent Iraqis is a sign that the war has developed in line with Chris-
tian views of just engagement."); see also Tom Carter, Report Decries Use of Cluster
Bombs, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at A17 ("The Human Rights Watch
report.., does credit the U.S. military with extensive efforts to prevent civilian
casualties.").
32. See Alan Cooperman, Prelate Reassures Catholic Soldiers, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 2003, at A28. The Roman Byzantine Church consists of approximately
5,000 members and is part of the Roman Catholic Church, but follows various
rites of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. ("The archbishop responsible for Roman Catholics in the U.S. mil-
itary has assured them that they can serve 'in good conscience' despite opposi-
tion to the war in Iraq from Pope John Paul II, his cardinals and many U.S.
bishops.")
35. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, OFFICE OF SocIAL DEVELOP-
MENT AND WORLD PEACE, WHAT SHOULD A CATHOLIC IN THE MILITARY Do IF HE
BELIEVES A PARTICULAR WAR To BE UNJUST AND HE Is REQUIRED To PARTICIPATE
IN THAT WAR?, at http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/peace/military2.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2005) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy) (emphasis added).
36. Id.
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leaders vis-A-vis their followers in the debate of a war's justness
and an individual's ability to participate in it.
This Article will examine the considerations of the morally
responsible professional soldier, Marine, sailor, and
Coastguardsmen (generically referred to as "soldiers") when
called upon to participate in a military campaign. Because both
the law and religion play a prominent role in this mental
calculus, the Article will address both the legal and religiously-
inspired moral constraints imposed on such a soldier when he or
she either elects to fight, or refuses to fight, in a controversial
military campaign. Finally, although the recent invasion of Iraq
will be discussed because of the various issues it raises, this Article
will not render any definitive judgments on the justness or legal-
ity of recent military operations in Iraq, but will merely use that
campaign as one of many historical events to highlight certain
points and issues.
I. ACCOMMODATING THE NEED To FIGHT: THE DEVELOPMENT
or JUST WAR DOCTRINE
A. Historical Development
Early Christians were largely pacifists who did not participate
in war.37 Indeed, there are few references to Christian soldiers
during the first three centuries of the Church's existence. The
lack of references to Christian soldiers no doubt can be attrib-
uted in large part to the influence of Jesus' message of nonvi-
olence. However, many Christians also avoided military service
because of various pagan rites common to the Roman Army.3 8
Further, during most of the Church's early years the average
Christian was not confronted with the thorny issue of serving
37. ALBERT C. WINN, AIN'T GONNA STUDY WAR No MORE: BIBLICAL AMBI.
GUITY AND THE ABOLITION OF WAR 193 (1993) ("The church of the first three
centuries ... was a peaceful, nonviolent church, whose members by and large
did not engage in warfare."); see also TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIET-
NAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 59 (1971) ("But in the Gospels there is much
emphasis on nonresistance and forgiveness of enemies, and during the first
three centuries after Christ there grew up among His followers a strong school
of religious pacifism.").
38. REGAN, supra note 1, at 5 n.2 ("The pagan rites associated with Roman
military service were an additional and perhaps decisive reason why early Chris-
tians shunned such service."); see also DARRELL COLE, WHEN GOD SAYS WAR Is
RIGHT: THE CHRISTIAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON WHEN AND How To FIGHT 8 (2002)
("These early believers were not, for the most part, opponents of warfare and
military service per se, instead, they objected to military service mainly because of
the role of pagan religious practices in the military.").
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both the State and God because the Roman Empire generally did
not call upon Christians to fight in its wars. 9
Sometime after the mid-second century, some references to
Christians serving in the army may be found, but they were the
exception rather than the rule; and Christian leaders and writers
of the time generally disapproved of military service.4" Christian
writers objected to the taking of life in wartime and to the mili-
tary requirement of performing various acts of idolatry.4" Some
writers went so far as to completely condemn all military service,
but the Church never adopted such a draconian position.42
Although early Christians rarely served in the Roman armed
forces, nothing in the New Testament indicates a condemnation
of military service.4" In Luke, Jesus speaks highly of a Roman
Centurion's faith, telling "the crowd that followed him . . . 'I tell
you, not even in Israel have I found such faith."' 44 Peter con-
verted Cornelius, "a Centurion of the Italian cohort," the first
39. See WINN, supra note 37, at 151 (Rome "did not draft Christians to
fight in its wars."); see also COLE, supra note 38, at 8 ("Roman authorities did not
wish Christians in their ranks .... ."); ARNOLD TOYNBEE, AN HISTORIAN'S
APPROACH TO RELIGION 96 (1956) ("In practice, however, this potential occa-
sion for conflict between the Roman Empire and the Christian Church caused
little trouble, because in practice the post-Augustan Roman Army . . . was a
professional force recruited by voluntary enlistment .... ").
40. See, e.g., WINN, supra note 37, at 194 ("Beginning around 178-180
there are allusions to Christians in the army . . . . Christian writers of this
period were unanimous in condemning Christian participation in warfare.");
REGAN, supra note 1, at 5 ("Fragmentary literary evidence from the second and
third centuries of the Christian era indicates that Church leaders either disap-
proved or looked down on Christian's serving in the imperial Roman
army .... ); ROLAND H. BAINTON, 1 CHRISTENDOM: A SHORT HISTORY OF CHRIS-
TIANITY AND ITS IMPACT ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION 60 (1966) ("The taking of life
in war was unanimously condemned by all Christian writers of the period prior
to Constantine, as far as such works are extant."); id. at 61 (" [S]ome Christians
did serve in the army, regardless of the injunctions of Church leaders. Yet...
Christian abstention from military service was . . . notorious.").
41. See BAINTON, supra note 40, at 60 ("The taking of life in war was unani-
mously condemned by all Christian writers of the period prior to Constan-
tine .... "); see also TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 59 (noting that a strong sense of
pacifism coupled with an abhorrence to acts of idolatry caused Church leaders
to condemn military service).
42. K. Honselmann, Pacifism, in 10 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 855
(1967) ("[O]nly Tertullian ... and Lactantius ... condemned military service
outright. None of the accepted Fathers of the Church ever adopted this
extreme position.").
43. Elizabeth Anscombe, War and Murder, in WAR, MORALIYr AND THE MIL-
ITARY PROFESSION 293 (Malham M. Wakin ed., 1979) ("[T]here is no suggestion
in the New Testament that soldiering was regarded as incompatible with
Christianity.").
44. Luke 7:9.
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Gentile to be converted.4 5 When soldiers sought guidance from
John the Baptist, he merely replied: "Do not extort money from
anyone by threats or false accusations, and be satisfied with your
wages."46 Further, Paul accepted protection from the military on
several occasions.4 7 Significantly, in none of these encounters
with the Roman military were the soldiers criticized for serving,
required to leave the Army, or told that their military service was
incompatible with Christianity.4"
The first major turning point in the Christian Church's atti-
tude toward military service is generally attributed to Emperor
Constantine's Edict of Milan in 313 A.D., after which military ser-
vice for Christians became both acceptable and more common-
place.4 9 Reportedly, in 312 A.D., as he was attempting to
consolidate his empire, Constantine had a vision of a cross
appearing above him bearing "the inscription 'By this sign, con-
quer. ' ' 50  Constantine converted to Christianity, his armies
45. Acts 10:1, 10:44-48.
46. Luke 3:14. Augustine opined that John responded in this manner
because he knew that the soldiers' "actions in battle were not murderous, but
authorized by law, and that the soldiers did not thus avenge themselves, but
defend the public safety." ST. AUGUSTINE, Contra Faustum, XXII, in THE POLITI-
CA.L WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 164 (Henry Paolucci ed., 1962). However, in
the KingJames version of the Bible, John also admonished the soldiers to "[d]o
violence to no man." Luke 3:14 (King James). Other versions of the Bible do
not contain this admonition. See, e.g., Luke 3:14 (New Revised Standard Ver-
sion); Luke 3:14 (The New American Bible).
47. See WINN, supra note 37, at 152 ("He accepted military protection
when the Jerusalem mob was trying to kill him ([Acts] 21:30-32), when the
dissension in the Sanhedrin became violent (23:10), and when a band of sworn
assassins planned to ambush him (23:12-35).").
48. See JOHN J. DAvis, EVANGELICAL ETHICS: ISSUES FACING THE CHURCH
TODAY 236-37 (1985); see also Honselmann, supra note 42, at 855 ("Nor, to
judge from [Jesus'] warm commendation of the faith of the centurion (Lk
3:14), did He regard the military profession as an impediment to disciple-
ship."); id. ("So too St. Peter preached peace (1 Pt 3:8-11), but he baptized the
centurion Cornelius without apparently requiring him to seek another profes-
sion (Acts 10:47).)"; WINN, supra note 37, at 152 ("Apparently no question was
ever raised regarding a possible conflict between [Cornelius'] daily occupation
and his profession as a Christian."); accord, ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 46, at
164-65.
49. DENNIS BYLER, MAKING WAY & MAKING PEACE, WHY SOME CHRISTIANS
FIGHT AND SOME DON'T 9 (1989) (After Constantine's edict in 313 A.D., the
church's "stance began to change" and "Christians began to serve actively in the
military in obedience to the State."); REGAN, supra note 1, at 5 ("The attitude of
Christians seems to have changed with the Edict of Milan (313 A.D.) and the
conversion of Constantine, and the practice of pacifism by Christians to have
waned."); see also WINN, supra note 37, at 194 ("Constantine placed the cross on
army standards and many Christians flocked into the army.").
50. BYLER, supra note 49, at 18-19; BAINTON, supra note 40, at 92.
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fought under that standard and he attributed his military victory,
in large part, to divine assistance from the Christian God.5 1
However, Emperor Constantine's motivations have been the
subject of dispute and his attitude toward Christianity may have
been motivated as much by political expediency as by religious
piety. Certainly, Constantine viewed Christian:,ty as a mechanism
for unifying his empire.5 2 Although Christians made up only ten
percent of the Roman Empire, the Church was considered to be
one of the strongest organizations within the Empire, with
churches in every province.53
Skeptical commentators note that Constantine "continued
to function as head of the Roman pagan religion."5 4 Even after
Constantine's conversion to Christianity, paganism remained a
powerful force and was the religion of choice for most of the
Empire.5 5 As a prudent ruler, Constantine "had to maintain a
studied ambiguity in religious policy ... ."56 Further, skeptics
point out that Constantine elected not to be baptized until 337
when he was near death; however, because baptism was viewed as
washing away all sins, it was considered prudent during those
times to wait until the death bed for baptism to take full advan-
tage of the spiritual cleansing.
5 7
Regardless of Constantine's true motivation, he did convert
to Christianity, renounced any claim to being a deity, and pub-
licly proclaimed himself a follower of the Christian faith.
58 More
importantly, he became a powerful patron for the Church. Con-
sequently, the Christian Church's stature rose within the Empire
and legislation was enacted giving the Church previously
unknown privileges and protections.
59
51. WINN, supra note 37, at 194; BAINTON, supra note 40, at 91-92.
52. WINN, supra note 37, at 194 ("Once in power he chose Christianity as
the religion that would unify his empire .... ."); BYLER, supra note 49, at 19 ("He
needed a centralized religion to help unify the state, and thought Christianity
would serve this purpose."); BAINTON, supra note 40, at 94 ("Constantine cer-
tainly hoped that the Church would prove to be a politically integrating
force.").
53. DONALD R. DUDLEY, THE CrVILIZATION OF ROME 213 (1962).
54. BYLER, supra note 49, at 19.
55. BAINTON, supra note 40, at 94; DUDLEY, supra note 53, at 215.
56. DUDLEY, supra note 53, at 215; see also TOYNBEE, supra note 39, at 249
(noting that Constantine had adopted a "prudent policy of toleration for all
faiths").
57. BAINTON, supra note 40, at 93.
58. Id. at 93-94.
59. Id.; see also WINN, supra note 37, at 194 (noting the new status
"showered favors on the church").
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For the Church, with these new privileges came certain
responsibilities to the State, including the inescapable involve-
ment in decisions involving the application of military force.
Christians were no longer social outcasts in a pagan society, but
were now recognized members of a Christian empire. Indeed, by
380 A.D., Christianity became the Empire's official religion.6"
Christians soon held positions of power and authority in Roman
government,6" and the Church became fully integrated into the
Empire's social and economic hierarchy.62
However, beginning approximately 350 A.D., the Roman
Empire began its final descent until the glory that was Rome was
no more.6 3 In 367, Roman forces in Britain suffered defeat at
the hands of a combined Irish, Pict, and Saxon assault; the Goths
mauled a Roman army in 375; Vandals, Alans, and Suebi
breached the Empire's Rhine defenses in 406; and Rome itself
was overrun by the Goths in 410.64 After the death of the
Emperor Theodosius in 395, the Empire was divided between his
two ineffectual sons into a western and eastern empire.6 5
The collapsing Roman Empire served as the backdrop to the
second major turning point for the Church's attitude toward mil-
itary service-Augustine's just war theory. Born in 354 A.D. in
what is now Algeria and appointed Bishop of Hippo in 395,
Augustine began to write his seminal work, City of God, only three
years after the Goth sack of Rome.6 6 Augustine was a realist who
recognized that man was imperfect and that war and violence
were societal norms, not exceptions to the norm. Peace on earth
was a vanishing dream: "Swords never had been beaten into
plowshares and never would."6 7 Augustine believed that Chris-
tians should fight to defend the Empire now that it was a Chris-
60. Adrian Hastings, 150-550, in A WORLD HIsroRY OF CHJSTIASI IY 41
(Adrian Hastings ed., 1999).
61. Id. at 40 ("The majority of senior people in power were soon at least
nominal Christians .... Bishops everywhere became figures of importance in
society.").
62. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 103 (1976).
63. See DUDLEY, supra note 53, at 206 ("From 350 onward the last phases
of dissolution in the Western Empire set in with the renewal of large-scale bar-
barian attacks.").
64. Id. at 206-19.
65. Id. at 219. From the death of Theodosius "until 476 the story in the
West is one of utter feebleness and incessant crises . . . ." Id. at 206.
66. Id. at 236-37. Augustine's City of God is believed to have "been
prompted by the sack of Rome . . . ." Hastings, supra note 60, at 56.
67. RoLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TowARD WAR & PEACE 91
(1960) ("With the passing of the home of Christian perfection was coupled the
vanishing of the dream of peace on earth.").
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tian one,' and he also sought to address those pagan critics who
charged that Christianity had undermined the martial spirit of
the Roman Empire.6 9
Further, as bishop, Augustine had his own barbarian
problems to contend with. With Hippo threatened by invasion,
the local Christian military commander, Boniface, decided to
leave the military and become a monk.7 ° In order to convince
Boniface to remain under arms and command the city's defense,
Augustine needed to formulate a reasoned argument permitting
Christians to kill during wartime. 7 This reasoned argument
formed the basis of the modern-day just-war doctrine.
Augustine believed that the "real evils in war are love of vio-
lence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild
resistance, and the lust of power, and such like . ,,7" Christians
could undertake wars in response to these evils,73 and had a duty
to come to the aid of others, although Augustine believed that
the law of love limited Christians from killing others when acting
purely in self-defense.7 " However, Christian warriors had to be
ordered to take up arms by a lawful authority7 5 and must pursue
the war with the intent of restoring peace.7 6 Further, Christian
68. WINN, supra note 37, at 194.
69. DAVIS, supra note 48, at 234; see also ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 46, at
xvii-xviii.
70. BYLER, supra note 49, at 22-23; see also BAINTON, supra note 40, at 128
("When Boniface, the Roman general in Africa... wanted to become a monk,
Augustine exclaimed, 'For God's sake not now! With the Vandals on the point
of crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, the general must fight."'). In 430, after
being defeated by the Vandals, Boniface retreated to Hippo where he com-
manded the besieged city for fourteen months-during which Augustine
died-until he was again defeated in battle. Leaving Hippo to the Vandals,
Boniface departed for Italy. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 46, at 276 n.1.
71. BYLER, supra note 49, at 23.
72. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 46, at 164; see COLE, supra note 38, at 23
("[F]or [Augustine] the wrongness of war lay in the moral evil of disordered
desire and twisted inward dispositions.")
73. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 46, at 164 ("[A]nd it is generally to punish
these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that . . . good
men undertake wars."); COLE, supra note 38, at 24 (Augustine required rulers
"to take vengeance on wrongdoers.").
74. REGAN, supra note 1, at 17 (noting the "duty to use force to aid others
is incumbent on authorities as well as private persons, since 'the injustice of the
opposing side . . . lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars"') (citing ST.
AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, bk. XIX, ch. 7); id. at 17 (Augustine believed that "the
law of love prohibit[ed] Christians from killing or wounding others in their
own defense .... ").
75. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 46, at 164 (requiring "obedience to God or
some lawful authority").
76. Id. at 182 (" [W]ar is waged in order that peace may be obtained."); see
also WINN, supra note 37, at 195 ("Its intent should be to restore peace and
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warriors were obligated to love their enemy, even in battle."
Augustine's just war doctrine gave "Christian rulers . . . a moral
theory on war that would reconcile their beliefs as Christians with
their responsibilities as statesmen."78
In his thirteenth century work, Summa Theologica, Saint
Thomas Aquinas refined Augustine's just war doctrine, introduc-
ing concepts of proportionality and discrimination,79 and permit-
ting the use of lethal force in self-defense.8" Aquinas dictated
three conditions for the just use of force: "(1) legitimate, that is,
constitutional authority should make the war decision; (2) war
should be waged for ajust cause; (3) statesmen should resort to
war with right intention."81
By the end of the seventeenth century, three additional
requirements were added to the just war calculus: "(4) the evils
of war, especially the loss of human life, should be proportionate
to the injustice to be prevented or remedied by war; (5) peaceful
means to prevent or remedy should be exhausted; (6) an other-
wise just war should have a reasonable hope of success." 2 Fur-
ther, although Aquinas touched upon notions of just war
conduct in his writings, theologians Vitoria and Suarez subse-
quently developed the jus in bello portion of the just war
doctrine. 83
Additionally, Luther, Calvin, and most leading Protestant
reformers adopted the Catholic just war position.8 4 Significantly,
Luther also viewed soldiering as an acceptable profession. 5
vindicate justice."); COLE, supra note 38, at 24 ("[Pleace is the ultimate goal of
war .... ).
77. REGAN, supra note 1, at 17 (Soldiers "should love the enemy they forci-
bly oppose."); WINN, supra note 37, at 195 ("Christians could and should love
their enemies, even in the act of killing them in battle.").
78. REGAN, supra note 1, at 17.
79. WINN, supra note 37, at 195.
80. REGAN, supra note 1, at 17 (Aquinas "held that individuals may use
proportionate force, even killing force, not only to defend others from harm
but also to defend themselves.").
81. Id. at 17 (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA, II-II, q. 40,
art. 1).
82. Id. at 17-18. These additional conditions are attributed to the theolo-
gians Francisco de Victoria and Francisco Suarez. Id.
83. Id. at 18.
84. DAviS, supra note 48, at 235; see BAINTON, supra note 67, at 136 ("All of
the Protestant state churches appropriated the just-war theory ...
85. BAINTON, supra note 67, at 139.
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B. Modern Application
Currently, the Roman Catholic Church, as articulated by the
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, lists ten criteria for evaluat-
ing the justness of a war, of which seven criteria relate to the jus
ad bellum determination and three to the jus in bello analysis.
8 6
Unfortunately, no definitive interpretation of these criteria exists
and they remain subject to differing interpretations. The jus ad
bellum determination is made after considering the following
criteria:
" Just Cause: force may be used only to correct a grave,
public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation of the
basic rights of whole populations;
* Comparative Justice: while there may be rights and
wrongs on all sides of a conflict, to override the presump-
tion against the use of force the injustice suffered by one
party must significantly outweigh that suffered by the
other;
* Legitimate Authority: only duly constituted public
authorities may use deadly force or wage war;
* Right Intention: force may be used only in a truly just
cause and solely for that purpose;
" Probability of Success: arms may not be used in a futile
cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are
required to achieve success;
* Proportionality: the overall destruction expected from
the use of force must be outweighed by the good to be
achieved;
" Last Resort: force may be used only after all peaceful
alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted.
7
Many just war theorists require that all jus ad bellum compo-
nents of the doctrine be satisfied before a war is deemed just.s"
86. See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, A Pastoral Message: Living
with Faith and Hope After September 11, Appendix (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/septl 1.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter "Pastoral Message"] (citing
excerpts from NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE HARVEST OF JUS-
TICE Is SOwN IN PEACE (1993)).
87. Id.
88. COLE, supra note 38, at 78 ("In general ... when any one of these
criteria cannot be met, Christians are forbidden to fight."); see George Weigel,
Moral Clarity in a Time of War, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2003, at 23, available at http://
firstthings.com/ftissues/ft03Ol/articles/weigel.html (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) (viewed as "a series of hurdles");
PREsRYrFRIANS AND MILITARY SERVICE, supra note 2, at 7 ("To have a just war all
of these criteria must be met."); J. PHILLIP WOCAMAN, CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES
ON POLITICS 348 (2000) (The just war tradition required that "each of these
2005]
106 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
Further, the modern interpretation of the just war doctrine
reflects a conservative attitude toward the use of force, an atti-
tude that includes a presumption against the use of military
force.8 9
Although not universally embraced,9" thejust war doctrine is
still followed by the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox
Churches, most Protestant faiths, and various other Christian
denominations.9 1 The doctrine provides a moral analytical
conditions had to be met before a Christian could consider a particular warjustified."). But cf. David Baer, The War on Terrorism and the Problem of Militaty
Intervention: Using Just War Theory to Frame Foreign Policy Debate, J. LUTHERAN ETH-
ics, Dec. 17, 2002, at 5, available at http://elca.org/jle/ articles/contempo-
raryissues/aricle.baer david.asp (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy) ("The purpose of just war theory is not to provide
churches and their theologians with a checklist for saying 'yes' or 'no' to partic-
ular wars.").
89. Maryann C. Love, Globilization, Ethics, and the War on Terrorism, 16
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 65, 71 (2002) ("JWT begins with a pre-
sumption against the use of force, that is only overcome in rare, extreme cir-
cumstances."); Paul J. Griffiths,Just War: An Exchange, FIRsT THINGS, Apr. 2002,
at 31, available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0204/articles/
justwar.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Pol-
icy) ("Convincing evidence" must be offered to rebut the presumption that the
use of force is "illegitimate and unjust."); United States Catholic Conference,
Excerpt From The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace (Nov. 1993), at http://
www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/ustwar.htm (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter "Harvest ofJustice"] ("The
just-war tradition begins with a strong presumption against the use of
force .. "); PRESBYTERIANS AND MILITARY SERVICE, supra note 2, at 7 ("UJ]ust war
principles are a strong presumption against violence .... "). But cf. Weigel,
supra note 88, at 22 ("Those scholars, activists, and religious leaders who claim
that the just war tradition 'begins' with a 'presumption against war' or a 'pre-
sumption against violence' are quite simply mistaken." And, "[tlhe classic tradi-
tion . . . begins with the presumption-better, the moral judgment-that
rightfully constituted public authority is under a strict moral obligation to
defend the security of those for whom it has assumed responsibility .. .");
Michael Novak, "Asymmetrical Warfare" & Just War, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 10,
2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/novak/novak021003.asp (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) (St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas' view of the just war doctrine did not start with a presumption
against violence, "but rather with a presumption that addresses first the duties
of public authorities to charity and justice .... ").
90. See, e.g., WINN, supra note 37, at 195 ("The bankruptcy of just war is
evident. It has seldom prevented wars, because 'Christian' nations always rea-
son that their cause is just."); see R.A. McCormick, Morality of War, in 14 NEw
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 806 (1967) ("The Catholic moral teaching on warfare
has been attacked not as erroneous but simply as irrelevant.").
91. DAVIS, supra note 48, at 234 ("The just-war position represents the
dominant majority within Christianity, including the Roman Catholic, Eastern
Orthodox, and Protestant expressions of faith."); see Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), Being a C. 0. in a Time of War, available at http://www.pcusa.org/wash-
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framework for discussing and evaluating the initiation and con-
duct of military campaigns.9 2 Further, it serves as the prism by
which public conscience and popular opinion are formed."
From a more practical perspective, political leaders will endeavor
to characterize military campaigns as being just, if for no other
reason than to gain and maintain popular support, both domesti-
cally and abroad. Further, as noted in the introduction, military
leaders will want to characterize the decision to go to war and the
subsequent conduct of hostilities, as legally and morally justifia-
ble in order to maintain national will and the morale of the
armed forces. Responsible soldiers will desire to meet the just
war criteria simply because it is the right thing to do.
C. Recent Developments
As the United States prepared to invade Iraq, a number of
issues arose which implicated the just war doctrine. Chief among
these issues was the legitimacy of a war that was not in direct
response to a military attack. In the case of Operation Iraqi Free-
ington/issuenet/crrl-0202 19 .htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) ("[T]he Presbyterian
Church (U.S.A.) is generally characterized as a 'just war' church .... ); United
Methodist Church Info. Serv., FAQ's About War and the United Methodist Church,
http://infoserv.umc.orgfaq/wariniraqfaqs.htm (Although just war is not refer-
enced in official church statements, "those who take up arms or who order
others to do so" are called upon to consider the just war principles.); Fourth
Churchwide Assembly, Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, For Peace in
God's World (Aug. 20, 1995), available at http://www.elca.org/dcs/
peacein.pf.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy) ("We seek guidance from the principles of the 'just/unjust war' tradi-
tion."); see also WINN, supra note 37, at 195 ("Just war is still the official position
of Roman Catholicism and the major Protestant bodies."); Bishop C. Dale
White, United Methodists and War, at *3, http://gbgm-umc.org/Response/arti-
cles/UMsandWar.htm (last visited July 14, 2003) ("The 2000 General Confer-
ence, after vigorous debate, for the first time in the history of Methodism
acknowledged most Christians accept the just-war doctrine."); cf Linton Weeks,
The Silent Majority Speaks Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2003, at Cl, C2 (referring to
a Baptist minister who "turns to Saint Augustine's 'just war' theory as a way to
grapple with his feelings about this conflict.").
92. McCormick, supra note 90, at 806 ("[1]ts value resides in its capacity
to set the right terms for rational debate on public policies bearing on the prob-
lem of war and peace in this age.") (citation omitted); COLE, supra note 38, at
107 ("The just war doctrine represents a tool for Christians, allowing them to
figure out the justice of a war .... "); see Pastoral Message, supra note 86, at 2
(characterizing "traditional Catholic teaching as a guide for our people and
nation, offering a moral framework").
93. See McCormick, supra note 90, at 806 (The relevance of Catholic
moral teaching concerning warfare "lies in its 'power to form the public con-
science and to clarify the climate of moral opinion in the midst of today's inter-
national conflict."') (citation omitted).
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dom, the United States partially justified the invasion of Iraq
under the controversial doctrine of preventive war. Additionally,
the decision to go to war without the support of much of the
international community, and in particular without the sanction
of the United Nations Security Council, generated considerable
discussion as to the role of the United Nations in the just war
calculus.
1. The Proactive Wars
Just war theorists have generally recognized the legitimacy of
fighting in a defensive war against an unwarranted attack.9 4
Catholic Catechism 2309 also recognizes as legitimate the defen-
sive use of military force. 5 Similarly, the right of self defense,
codified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, is a recog-
nized legal right of long-standing in international law."
However, there are certain proactive wars that have proved
more difficult to reconcile with both international law and the
modern notion of a just war. This is largely because the just war
theory anticipates the exhaustion of peaceful avenues for conflict
resolution.9 7 Similarly, international law, as exemplified by pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter, encourages the peaceful
resolution of international disputes. For example, Article 2(3)
requires all members to "settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered." Further, Article 33(1)
provides: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
94. COLE, supra note 38, at 79 ("[Slelf-defense against an aggressor" is ajust cause.); REGAN, supra note 1, at 48 ("Nations have a prima faciejust cause to
defend their territory and citizens against armed attack.");Jean B. Elshtain, The
Third Annual Grotius Lecture: Just War and Humanitarian Intervention, 17 Am. U.
INT'L L. REv. 1, 7 (2001) ("The primaryjust cause in an era of nations and states
is a nation's response to direct aggression.").
95. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, No. 2309, at 556 (Libreria Edi-
trice Vaticana trans., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter CATECHISM].
96. Captain Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response
to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115,
128-29 (1999) ("The international community recognized the theory of self-
defense long before adopting the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter merely codified the theory and transformed it into an
international agreement to which all signatory states must adhere.").
97. See CATECHISM, supra note 95, at 556 ("[C]overnments cannot be
denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed.")
(quoting CATECHISM No. 2308); cf REGAN, supra note 1, at 49 ("U]ustice
requires that nations be willing to negotiate or arbitrate genuine territorial dis-
putes .... ."); Elshtain, supra note 94, at 5 ("[A] war must be the last
resort . . ").
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security, shall first of all seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their choice." However, despite the preference for peaceful reso-
lution of international conflicts, a nation need not wait until it is
attacked before it may legitimately take military action.
One form of proactive warfare is the preemptive strike (or
war), whose legitimacy is based on the right of anticipatory self-
defense. Pursuant to this legal theory, "a state may respond to an
imminent threat of force before that force is actually exerted.""
8
Anticipatory self-defense was recognized as a legitimate right of
states prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter, and is recog-
nized by current customary international law and permitted by
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.99 Manyjust war theorists also rec-
ognize the legitimacy of a preemptive strike under appropriate
circumstances.1 ° ' However, the requirement "that the threat be
imminent" ' is key to the invocation of this theory as ajustifica-
tion for the use of force. Further, at least one just war theorist
requires as a condition precedent to a justifiable preemptive
attack that the attacking nation possess "moral certitude about
the hostile intentions of the putative would-be aggressor
nation .... "102
The 1967 Israeli attack on its Arab neighbors that initiated
the Six-Day War serves as a frequently cited example of a pre-
emptive attack that was both legal"0 3 and just.10 4 In mid-May,
98. Condron, supra note 96, at 129; see also Stephen Murdoch, Preemptive
War: Is It Legal?, WASH. LAw., Jan. 2003, at 26 ("The element of imminent threat
exists in preemption, which is considered a legitimate use of force in interna-
tional law ....").
99. Condron, supra note 96, at 129-31; see Alex Wagner, UN. Charter
Offers No Justification for War On Iraq, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 53 ("Cer-
tainly, the U.N. Charter permits what is commonly known as preemptive war-a
situation where one state, fearing an imminent attack, acts first.").
100. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 1, at 51 ("A nation need not wait until it is
attacked to have just cause to use military force against a would-be aggressor; it
is as much an act of self defense to initiate hostilities to prevent imminent
attack as it is to respond to hostilities already initiated by an aggressor.").
101. Condron, supra note 96, at 131; cf REGAN, supra note 1, at 5.
102. REGAN, supra note 1, at 52.
103. Murdoch, supra note 98, at 24 ("[M] any international law experts...
believe that article 51 [of the U.N. Charter] should not render illegal Israel's
1967 attack on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria at the outset of the Six-Day War."); see
alsoJoseph S. Nye, Before War, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2003, at A27 ("Preemption
in the face of imminent attack-such as Israel faced in 1967-is widely
regarded as acceptable self-defense .... "); Robert F. Turner, Military Action
Against Iraq IsJnstified, NAVAL WAR C. REv., Autumn 2002, at 72, 74 ("I share the
view that Israel was lawfully defending itself against an imminent attack."); DIN-
STEIN, supra note 2, at 172-73 (legitimate "interceptive" self-defense).
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1967, Egypt placed its armed forces on alert, began massing
forces in the Sinai, ordered U.N. forces out of the Sinai and Gaza
strip, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israel."°5 President Nassar
of Egypt declared that in the event of war, Egypt would seek the
complete destruction of Israel.' °6 Israel unsuccessfully pursued
various diplomatic initiatives and appealed in vain for interna-
tional assistance. 10 7 First Syria, then Jordan and Iraq, formed a
wartime alliance with Egypt against Israel.10 8
Militarily, the Arab coalition posed a significant threat toIsrael. The Egyptian army deployed in the Sinai consisted of
over 100,000 soldiers with some 900 tanks."°9 Within striking dis-
tance of Israel were approximately 240,000 hostile Arab soldiers
supported by approximately 1,700 tanks.110 Additionally, the
Egoyptian Air Force enjoyed numerical superiority over its Israeli
counterpart and the Egyptian aircraft were capable of striking
"the main Israeli bases [in] between seven and fifteen minutes,
i.e., not enough time for interception."''
On June 5, 1967, the day after Iraq joined the Arab alliance,
Israel determined that military action was required and launched
a preemptive strike." 2 Although Israel may not have exhausted
all possible peaceful alternatives to war, in the face of an immi-
nent and escalating threat, Israel pursued those peaceful alterna-
tives it believed were reasonably available to it within the time
allowed before striking.
Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates another and more
expansive type of proactive war. Although the recent invasion of
Iraq has been described by some as a preemptive war, it is more
104. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 85 (1977) ("The
Israeli first strike is, I think, a clear case of legitimate anticipation."); ThomasRyba, Countdown to Iraq: Is It a just War' or just Another War, J. & COURIER(Lafayette, Ind.), Mar. 9, 2003, at 11 ("[T]he Six Day War, in 1967, was viewed
asjust. .. ").
105. WALZER, supra note 104, at 82-83. The Straits of Tiran were an inter-
national waterway. Id. at 83.
106. Id. at 83; see EnWARD LUTrWAK & DAN HOROWITZ, THE ISRAELI ARMY224 (1975) ("[T]he Arabs were proclaiming the imminence of a war of
extermination ....").
107. WALZER, supra note 104, at 84; LurTWAK & HoRowrrz, supra note106, at 221, 224 (noting that the Israeli Foreign Minister traveled "back and
forth in a humiliating quest for help from Washington, London or Paris").
108. WALZER, supra note 104, at 93.
109. LuTrWAK & HOROWITZ, supra note 106, at 222.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. WALZER, supra note 104, at 82.
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appropriately characterized as a preventive war."' The key dif-
ference between the two types of proactive wars is that a preven-
tive war lacks an imminent threat." 4 "Rather than trying to
preempt specific, imminent threats, the goal is to prevent more
generalized threats from materializing."' 15 Indeed, in his Janu-
ary 28, 2003, State of the Union address, President Bush acknowl-
edged that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was not an
imminent one. 1 6 However, the President pointed out that ter-
rorists and tyrants do not normally give advanced notice of their
intention to strike and posited further that if the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein "is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all
actions, all words and all recriminations would come too late."
1
"
7
Not surprisingly, the partial justification of Operation Iraqi
Freedom as a preventive war has proved controversial both with
religious leaders 18 and with legal scholars. American bishops
questioned "the moral legitimacy of any preemptive, unilateral
use of military force to overthrow the government of Iraq."'
1 9
The apparent focus of their concern was both general and spe-
cific with regard to an invasion of Iraq. First, the bishops were
concerned that permitting "preemptive or preventive uses of mil-
itary force to overthrow threatening or hostile regimes would cre-
ate deeply troubling moral and legal precedents."' 20 Next, the
group opined that based on the factual information in their pos-
session, "It is difficult to justify resort to war against Iraq, lacking
113. Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM.
J. Ir'L L. 599, 599 (2003) (noting that it is "more accurate to describe it as
'preventive' self-defense"); see alsoJim VandeHei, Clark Says Bremer Should Be
Replaced, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at A3 (Retired General Wesley Clark stated
"that Bush's policy is more one of 'preventive war' . . . ."); Wagner, supra note
99, at 53 (arguing that the war "should be characterized as a preventive war").
114. Sapiro, supra note 113, at 599; see also VandeHei, supra note 113, at
A3.
115. Sapiro, supra note 113, at 599.
116. President George W. Bush, State of the Union (Jan. 28, 2003),
reprinted in America... Will Not Be Blackmailed, WASH. PosT, Jan. 29, 2003, at AlO,
All.
117. Id.atAll.
118. Joe Feuerherd, Opinions Clash on Just War, NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Feb.
7, 2003, at 3, available at http://www.natcath.org/NCR_Online/ archives/
020703/020703d.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &
Public Policy) (citing criticism by religious leaders from the Catholic, Episcopal,
United Methodist churches and the United Church of Christ).
119. Most Reverend Wilton D. Gregory, President, United States Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, Statement on Iraq (Feb. 26, 2003), at http://
www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/iraqstatement02O3.htm (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter USCCB Feb.
2003 Statement].
120. Id.
2005]
112 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 19
clear and adequate evidence of an imminent attack of a grave
nature or Iraq's involvement in the terrorist attacks of September
11."1"' Some scholars critical of the preventive war doctrine
argue that it is an illegal use of military force and that it is an
unwise exercise of foreign policy.'2 2
In contrast, the country's largest Protestant church, the
Southern Baptist Convention, opined that the Bush administra-
tion's application of the preventive war doctrine to Iraq fell
"within the time-honored criteria of the just war theory as devel-
oped by Christian theologians in the late fourth and fifth centu-
ries A.D."' 23 Additionally, the general proposition that under
certain conditions a nation may attack another nation preemp-
tively before a threat is imminent has gained support from a wide
variety of sources, including various scholars124 and just war theo-
rists. 125 The argument in support of the legitimacy of a preemp-
tive strike when a threat is not imminent seems particularly
strong when the menacing nation is one that has indicated an
unwillingness to abide by acceptable standards of behavior-the
"rogue" nation-and is either developing, or stockpiling, weap-
ons of mass destruction. 126 Indeed, one ethicist has posited that
"there is a moral obligation to ensure that this lethal combination
121. Id.
122. Murdoch, supra note 98, at 26 (arguing that preventive war "is anillegitimate use of force," and that "foreign policies based on prevention may
actually lead to an increase in the use of force, especially when adopted in a
tense situation like between India and Pakistan").
123. Feuerherd, supra note 118, at 3.
124. See, e.g., Nye, supra note 103, at A27 (stating that preemptive wars
may be justified against terrorists and "deviant" nations, but recommending
achievement of broad international consensus).
125. REGAN, supra note 1, at 51 ("[A] would-be victim nation [need not]
wait until a would-be aggressor nation is immediately poised to attack before
the would-be victim nation has just cause to strike preemptively ... although
the more remote the threat, the more the opportunity to redress by means
short of war (e.g., diplomacy, economic sanctions).").
126. Id ("Nor need a would-be victim nation wait until a would-be aggres-
sor nation has stockpiled nuclear or chemical weapons before the potential vic-
tim nation has just cause to strike plants producing such weapons of
destruction."); see also Turner, supra note 103, at 74 ("This is all the more
important in an age when the first attack could involve the slaughter of literally
millions of innocent people."); Weigel, supra note 88, at 24 ("The peace of
order is also under grave threat when vicious, aggressive regimes acquire weap-
ons of mass destruction-weapons that we must assume, on the basis of their
treatment of their own citizens, these regimes will not hesitate to use against
others."). A recent poll of Presbyterian pastors and elders found that a signifi-
cant minority, thirty-nine percent, viewed as just a "war 'to preemptively destroy
weapons of mass destruction' .... " Jack Marcum, War and Peace, PRESBYTERIANS
TODAY, Mar. 2003, at 5 (Presbyterian Church U.S.A.).
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of irrational and aggressive regimes, weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and credible delivery systems does not go unchallenged."
'127
Side-stepping the issue of the effect on the just war calculus of
America's mistaken belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction immediately prior to the invasion, few would contest
that it would have been simply unacceptable for Saddam Hussein
to possess nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction.
Arguments in favor of the legitimization of a preventive war
doctrine are particularly persuasive in cases involving the threat
of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Various
commentators now argue that terrorism has changed the just war
calculus, making "preemptive military strikes . . . a Christian
option in ajust war. ... "128 Further, there is growing support for
the position that should a terrorist organization, such as al
Qaeda, be discovered attempting to develop weapons of mass
destruction, that the United States, or other potential victim
nations, could legitimately destroy the terrorist facility before the
weapons had actually been developed or the threat had become
immediate.129 Characterized as an exercise in self-defense, this is
the position of the Bush administration."'
0
The just war requirement to exhaust available avenues of
peaceful redress before resorting to the use of force is not abso-
lute. In theory, other avenues for the peaceful resolution of con-
flict always exist. A nation may surrender, elect not to respond to
acts of aggression, or concede unlawfully seized territory. After
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States could
have sued for peace with Japan, but the failure to resort to such
peaceful recourse did not deprive the United States of the char-
acterization of hostilities against Japan as being just.
127. Weigel, supra note 88, at 24.
128. Larry Witham, Christians Divided Over Reply to Attacks, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001, at A2.
129. Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited: U.S. Security Strategy
and theJus Ad Bellum, 176 MIL. L. REv. 364, 393-96 (2003); cf REGAN, supra note
1, at 53-54 ("Nations whose citizens are targets at home and abroad may have
just cause to use military force to prevent or deter foreign governments from
lending support and to destroy terrorist bases in foreign countries.").
130. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, ch. Ill, 6
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY] (We will "exercise our right of self defense by acting
preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against
our people and our country."). The Bush administration offered a three-prong
criteria: "[t]he inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's
threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our
adversaries' choice of weapons." Id. at 15.
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Quite simply, there are reasonable limits to the requirement
of exhausting peaceful means for conflict resolution. Israel's
preemptive strike against Egypt in 1967 in the face of the menac-
ing Egyptian threat was not unjust simply because other diplo-
matic initiatives remained available. Similarly, the United States
and its allies launched a just war during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War even though they could have allowed Iraq to retain the
unlawfully seized nation of Kuwait or pursued further diplomacy
without a reasonable expectation of success. In all these cases,
potential avenues for peaceful resolution continued to exist and,
at least in theory, held some small possibility of success, but the
use of military force was justified nonetheless.
Additionally, the imminence of the military threat that legiti-
mizes a preemptive strike takes on a different analysis when the
potential threat is one posed by a terrorist organization in theprocess of obtaining weapons of mass destruction. The temporalimminence of the threat shifts from the traditional short period
of time before an attack is likely to be launched to "the last viable
window of opportunity, the point at which any further delay
would render a viable defense ineffectual." '' In the case of
secretive, highly mobile terrorists, any opportunity to strike may
be the last viable window of opportunity to prevent a terrorist
attack. 132
The real objection to preventive war appears not to be withits morality per se-because it is not inherently immoral-but
rather with its susceptibility for abuse. 133 In the case of Iraq, few
would contest that the Iraqi people and the world at large are
better off without Saddam Hussein, who was undeniably a tyrant
responsible for the deaths of thousands, who waged an aggressive
war against Kuwait, and who used poison gas against his own peo-ple. Opponents of the doctrine do not focus on the unfairness
or unjustness of removing Hussein from power, but rather voice
a legitimate concern that sanctioning the use of a preventive war
by the United States against Iraq will open a Pandora's box,
encouraging preventive military campaigns under less justifiable,
and potentially more catastrophic, circumstances.13 1 Also, critics
131. Schmitt, supra note 129, at 394.
132. Id. (noting that the acquisition of intelligence about the location of
a terrorist planning cell may "represent the last opportunity to prevent the
attack").
133. The Nazis characterized the invasion of the Soviet Union as a "pre-
ventive war." PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 183 (2001).
134. See, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, War to Prevent War, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 7,2003, at 43 ("Imagine for a moment that India or Pakistan had adopted a simi-lar security strategy at any time during the past few years. A preventive strike by
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argue that justifying the invasion of Iraq by characterizing it as a
preventive war will establish a dangerous precedent.'
35 Further,
as exemplified by the recent invasion of Iraq, the determination
of when a preventive strike is necessary is highly subjective,136
and an accurate prediction of the threat justifying military action
in the preventive war context against a nation is difficult to make.
In sum, the just war doctrine should be flexible enough to
accommodate at least some military response to the threat posed
by terrorist organizations seeking to obtain and use weapons of
mass destruction. Although the modem notion of a just war
envisions self-defense against aggression, the classic just war tradi-
tion had a broader view of legitimate reasons to go to war, which
may have renewed application in the war against terrorism. A
justifiable reason to engage in hostilities under the classic tradi-
tion included "the punishment of evil." 1
7 Further, a nation
could justly oppose acts of aggression leveled against other
nations or peoples who could not adequately defend them-
selves.1 ' Finally, as discussed above, the exercise of legitimate
self-defense is not limited to a military response to an actual
attack but includes a preemptive strike in the face of an immi-
nent military threat. With respect to the threat posed by ter-
rorists, an expanded view of the imminency of that threat is
appropriate, if not compelling.' 39
2. Role of the United Nations
The role of the United Nations in the just war calculus
became a significant issue on the eve of the invasion of Iraq. In a
September 2002 letter to the President, the Administrative Com-
mittee of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops opined that
the just war criteria of legitimate authority required, in part,
"some form of international sanction, preferably by the U.N.
either country would have brought the world to (or past) the brink of a nuclear
disaster."); see also Wagner, supra note 99, at 53.
135. USCCB Feb. 2003 Statement, supra note 119 ("To permit preemp-
tive or preventive uses of military force to overthrow threatening or hostile
regimes would create deeply troubling moral and legal precedents.").
136. Colonel Gordon R. Hammock, Iraq, Preemption, and the Views of
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, 17 AIR & SPACE POWERJ. 84, 85 (2003)
("[lit injects a fair amount of subjective judgment into an equation that had
historically been more objective in nature.").
137. Weigel, supra note 88, at 24-25.
138. Elshtain, supra note 94, at 8.
139. The Bush administration has taken this position as part of its
national security strategy. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 130, at 15
("We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objec-
tives of today's adversaries.").
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Security Council."' 4 ° Further, an envoy from the Pope to Presi-
dent Bush reportedly stated that "war would be 'illegal' and
'unjust' without further U.N. authorization."141 Similarly, various
lay commentators, including the United Nations Secretary Gen-
eral, 14 2 asserted that United Nations approval was required
before the United States and its allies could legally take military
action against Iraq. 143  Although not specifically requiring
United Nations approval as a prerequisite for either the legality
or justness of military action, other commentators opine, none-
theless, that there should be some role for the United Nations in
this moral calculus.144 The Bush administration posited that
"previous U.N. Security resolutions confer international legal
authority for a 'just' war against Iraq to oust President Saddam
Hussein and rid the country of weapons of mass destruction."'45
As noted above, the role of the United Nations in the just
war analysis has been linked to the requirement that a war be
waged pursuant to legitimate authority.'4 6 Originally, the legiti-
140. Letter from Bishop Wilton D. Gregory to President Bush on Iraq(Sept. 13, 2002), http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/iiternational/bush902.htm (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
141. Alan Cooperman, Vatican Weighs in Against War, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
2003, at A20.
142. Lee Michael Katz, Out of the Loop, 35 NAT'L J. 1623, 1623 (2003)("[U.N. Secretary General Kofi] Annan suggested that without council
approval, the war could violate international law.").
143. See Peter Slevin, Legality of War is a Matter of Debate, WASH. POST, Mar.18, 2003, at A16 ("Russian President Vladimir Putin said a military assault with-
out U.N. authorization would be illegal and harmful" and noting conflicting
opinions of various academics as to war's legality without a new U.N. SecurityCouncil resolution); see asoJimmy Carter, Just War-or a just War?, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2003, at 13 (suggesting international authority is required).
144. See, e.g., Nye, supra note 103, at A27 (" [T]he price of moving frompreemption to prevention should be some form of collective legitimization,preferably under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which is concerned with
threats to the peace as well as acts of aggression."); see alsoJoseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Why We Need a Second U.N. Resolution, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2003, at A21 (argu-ing that a second resolution would not be a legal requirement but would prove
beneficial to the United States for strategic and political reasons).
145. Slevin, supra note 143, at Al6; see also Novak, supra note 89 ("[T]his
war is a lawful conclusion to the just war fought and swiftly won in February
1991.").
146. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Statement on Iraq(Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/iraq.htm (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter USCCB Nov.
2002 Statement]; see Gary Payton, Who Makes the Call?, PREsBYI-ERIANs TODAY,Nov. 2003, at 17 ("In our interdependent world the only 'legitimate authority'
on such crucial questions as war and peace is the United Nations."); cf REGAN,
supra note 1, at 24-47 (discussing the role of the UN in his chapter entitled
"Legitimate Authority.").
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mate authority prong of the just war theory had no international
component to it. The Augustinian view of legitimate authority
was limited to the secular authority of a properly constituted
leader.' 47 Concerned about the particular horrors and anarchy
associated with civil wars, Luther considered any war launched by
a nation's citizenry against its lawful prince as unjust.148 Calvin
permitted Christian participation in a war of rebellion against a
corrupt lawful authority, but only if led by "someone in a place of
authority."1 49 However, the traditional just war theorists focused
exclusively on the just war's requisite legitimate authority as
being the prince or princes of the belligerent nations, rather
than any international body.
It appears that two prongs to the legitimate authority ele-
ment of the just war theory are now developing-the traditional
national prong and the more recent international prong.'
5 0
When a nation takes military action in satisfaction of the require-
ments of its domestic law, coupled with United Nations Security
Council authorization, then the legitimate authority component
of the just war theory should be satisfied. Conversely, if the mili-
tary forces of a nation were to take military action in contraven-
tion of its domestic laws and after the United Nations had
affirmatively condemned or forbidden such action, then it would
appear equally clear that the legitimate authority component
had been violated. The more difficult question arises when a
nation acts militarily where only one of the two authority prongs
have been satisfied.
Were the United Nations to authorize, or even mandate, the
use of military force by a member state in the face of that
nation's refusal, under its own domestic law to authorize the
147. BAINTON, supra note 67, at 97 ("On the prince rests the responsibility
for determining when the sword may be used."); see also COLE, supra note 38, at
78 (noting that the traditional just war doctrine requires that the decision to go
to war be made by proper authority, that is, by "[a] nation's sovereign leaders").
148. COLE, supra note 38, at 78-79.
149. Id. at 79.
150. SeeJames T. Johnson, The Use of Force: AJustified Response, reprinted in
WAR AS CRUCIFIXION 32 (2002):
In the international context, right authority was provided [in the Per-
sian Gulf War] by the Security Council's resolution authorizing force.
In the U.S., right authority consists in the powers granted to the Presi-
dent by the Constitution and by the War Powers Act and by the con-
gressional resolutions decisively adopted on January 12 and 13
authorizing use of force against Iraq.
Id.; CoiF, supra note 38, at 78 ("A nation's sovereign leaders" are the proper
authority to declare war); id. at 80 ("[T]he United States and other nations
have theoretically agreed to allow the UN the privilege of being the only entity
with the proper authority to sanction such a war.").
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commitment of military forces, the legitimate authority compo-
nent of the theory would not be satisfied. The satisfaction of a
member state's domestic legal requirements is a condition prece-
dent to meeting the just war doctrine's legitimate authority
criteria.
Just war theorist Richard Regan persuasively argues this
point. Article 43 of the U.N. Charter requires member countries
to make military forces available to the United Nations for
enforcement actions, pursuant to Article 42, and is subject to the
proviso that the special agreements providing for such forces
"shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accor-
dance with their respective constitutional processes. ' 15 1 Absent
such special agreements, "the charter presumes that members
should and would [contribute forces in response to a UN Secur-
ity Council mandate] according to their own constitutional
processes.115 2 Similarly, should the United Nations Security
Council authorize or encourage the commitment of military
forces, a member state would determine whether or not to par-
ticipate in accordance with its domestic law.1"' In short, the
Charter contemplates that any member state's commitment of
military force will be accomplished only after its domestic legal
requirements are satisfied.
In contrast, should the United Nations Security Council fail
to take a definitive position authorizing or condemning the use
of force, and a nation elects to take military action after satisfying
its own domestic legal requirements, then the legitimate author-
ity component should be met. Indeed, the Charter contemplates
that a country may have to take military action before the Secur-
ity Council has acted. Article 51 of the Charter specifically pro-
vides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Secur-
ity Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. 15 4
Although United Nations Security Council authorization
and/or widespread international support for military action
would serve as evidence that the international community views
that campaign as a justified one, the absence of a definitive posi-
tion by the United Nations should not be viewed as dispositive
when evaluating the justness of war. The only part of the Catho-
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 3; REGAN, supra note 1, at 29-30.
152. REGAN, supra note 1, at 30.
153. Id. at 32.
154. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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lic Catechism (i.e., 2308) to address the role of international
bodies in the just war context states: "All citizens and all govern-
ments are obliged to work for the avoidance of war. However, 'as
long as the danger of war persists and there is no international
authority with the necessary competence and power, govern-
ments cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all
peace efforts have failed.
' '
1
1 55
Nations support or oppose the military campaigns of other
countries for a variety of reasons, and the just war objection is
merely one. The United Nations is rarely an impartial body
when deliberating such matters. Further, the lack of U.N.
approval, particularly by the U.N. Security Council, may have lit-
tle, if anything, to do with the justness of the proposed campaign.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union would have vetoed any
resolution supporting military action against a Warsaw Pact coun-
try or one of the Soviet client states, as the United States likely
would have vetoed a resolution authorizing military force against
one of our allies. In some cases, it may simply be impossible to
gain U.N. authorization to use force, regardless of the righteous-
ness of the cause for taking military action.
The Korean War illustrates this point. The June 25, 1950,
North Korean invasion of its southern neighbor is viewed as an
illegal aggressive war, and the commitment of forces by the
United States and her many allies is generally viewed as a just
war. On the same day as the invasion, the United Nations Secur-
ity Council approved an emergency resolution calling for North
Korea to immediately stop hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th
parallel. 156 Two days later, the U.N. Security Council passed a
second resolution calling on U.N. member states to "furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel
the armed attack and to restore international peace and security
in the area."1 57 Numerous countries committed military forces
to the conflict, which was fought under the U.N. flag-albeit
under U.S. command.'5 8  The aggression was eventually
repulsed.
Significantly, however, U.N. Security Council approval was
achieved only because the Soviet delegate was fortuitously absent,
having elected to boycott security council meetings over the fail-
155. CATECHISM, supra note 95, at 555-56.
156. T.R. FFHRENBACH, THIs KIND OF WAR [KOREA]: A STUDY IN UNPREPAR-
EDNESS 78 (1963).
157. Id. at 86.
158. REGAN, supra note 1, at 28.
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ure to include communist China within the council.' 59 Further,
in the event of a Soviet veto, the United States was prepared to
take military action without U.N. authorization.1 6 Assuming
that the American commitment of military forces to stop the
North Korean invasion was 'just," it seems almost farcical to sug-
gest that the same commitment of military force would be unjust
had the Soviet delegate been present and vetoed the second reso-
lution that called upon U.N. members to assist in repelling the
North Korean invasion. Similarly, were North Korea to launch
an unwarranted invasion of its southern neighbor today, the just-
ness of American military intervention should not be called into
question simply because China elected to veto any resolution
authorizing military force to repel North Korean aggression.
With respect to the recent military operations against Iraq,
numerous commentators have charged that the United Nations
proved largely impotent in its ability to deal with longstanding
Iraqi misconduct.1 6 1 Some commentators have attributed the
inability of the United States to obtain a favorable U.N. Security
Council resolution to the questionable motives of various mem-
bers of the Council.1 62 If the criticisms of the United Nations are
159. FEHRENBACH, supra note 156, at 77 ("But for all his determination
and swiftness of action, only one fact allowed [Secretary General] Lie to suc-
ceed: the Soviet Union, which with the other four great powers enjoyed the
veto, was not in attendance.").
160. CALLUM A. MACDONALD, KOREA: THE WAR BEFORE VIETNAM 32
(1986) ("Washington' was prepared to act in default of UN backing if the Rus-
sians cast a veto, arguing that unilateral action was in support of the UN
charter.").
161. Alan W. Dowd, Thirteen Years: The Causes and Consequences of the War
in Iraq, 33 PARAMETERS 46, 52-53 (2003) (noting that despite a U.N. Security
Council Resolution finding "that Iraq had failed to provide accurate and full
disclosure of its nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, had repeatedly
obstructed access to weapon sites, and was in material breach of UN disarma-
ment demands," and the failure of U.N. inspectors to account for Iraq's biologi-
cal and chemical weapons, when the United States and Britain sought U.N.
authorization for the use of force, France and Germany opposed it "and the
rest of the Security Council shrugged"); see Feuerherd, supra note 118, at 3
("'12 years of [Iraqi] resistance to 17 U.N. resolutions' and ongoing efforts to
'maintain a chemical and biological weapons stockpile and to develop a nuclear
capability.'" (quoting ethicist George Wiegel)); cf Katz, supra note 142, at 1623(recognizing that Saddam Hussein played a decade-long "game of cat and
mouse with the U.N." and stating that "[t]welve years of wrangling with Saddam
over U.N. weapons inspections was rendered moot in a few weeks of ground
combat").
162. George Will, U.N. Absurdity, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at A23 ("For
France . . . the objective of disarming Iraq, if ever seriously held, has been
superseded by the objective of frustrating America."); see also Phyllis Schlafly,
Why U.N. Is Not the Solution, WASH. TINiES, May 26, 2004, at A17 (alleging that
France and Russia opposed the military invasion of Iraq because they were
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correct, then it hardly would constitute the "international
authority with the necessary competence and power" referred to
in the Catholic Catechism. Indeed, one international law scholar
forcefully posited: "If the Security Council lacks the courage to
uphold the Charter, enforce its edicts, and protect international
peace and security after recognizing the existing threat that Sad-
dam poses to the world community, the states that are
threatened by his unlawful behavior have a right to protect
themselves."16 3
Within the United States, the legitimate authority prong of
the just war test refers to the actions of Congress and the Presi-
dent, under the appropriate oversight of the United States judici-
ary. Optimally, the United States would go to war after Congress
declares war and the President orders American forces into com-
bat. However, for various political or legal 1 64 reasons, a formal
declaration of war may not be desirous. Indeed, the United
States has not formally declared war since World War II. The
legitimate authority prong would nevertheless be satisfied follow-
ing congressional action short of a formal declaration of war,
such as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Vietnam), the 1991 Gulf
War Resolution, or the October 2002 Congressional Resolution
authorizing the use of force against Iraq. 165 At an absolute mini-
prime beneficiaries of the lucrative Oil-for-Food Program); Brian Stiltner, The
Justice of War On Iraq, J. LUTHERAN ETHICS, Mar. 20, 2003, at 4 ("France, Russia,
and China proceeded with war completely ruled out as an option.... [T]he
moral high ground of these three countries is also questionable, given the eco-
nomic ties they have and seek with Iraq."), available at http://www.elca.org/jle/
articles/contemporaryissues/articlestiltner-brian-pf.html (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); Damjan de Krnjevic-Mis-
kovic, French Toast: Paris Has Overplayed Its Hand, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at
A17 (opining that French opposition was part of its efforts to rival "America's
global preeminence"); Dowd, supra note 161, at 54 ("Still others, from US sena-
tors to academics, argue that the French and Germans were simply using Iraq to
send the Bush Administration a message.").
163. Turner, supra note 103, at 75; cf. REGAN, supra note 1, at 44 ("The
[Security Council], of course, may fail to act, and individual nations retain their
moral and legal right to defend themselves.").
164. One possible legal reason counseling against a declaration of war is
the resultant expansion in military criminal jurisdiction. During periods of
declared war, the military possesses court-martial jurisdiction over civilians
"serving with or accompanying [a United States military] force in the field."
Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(a)(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (10) (2000).
Such jurisdiction would extend to civilian contractors and members of the
media among others.
165. See Jim VandeHei & Juliet Eilperin, Congress Passes Iraq Resolution,
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2002, at 1 ("The House and Senate voted overwhelmingly
to grant President Bush the power to attack Iraq unilaterally, remove Saddam
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mum, presidential action, coupled with congressional inaction,
should still satisfy the just war's legitimate authority prong.' 66
It is unclear what role international approval, particularly
that of the United Nations, currently enjoys in the just war
calculus. Clearly, a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force
would serve as some evidence that a particular military campaign
is just, or at least evidence that it is perceived as such by the inter-
national community. Further, United Nations resolutions
authorizing member states to use military force such as occurred
during the Korean and first Gulf wars, cloak such military cam-
paigns with legal legitimacy, at least under international law. Of
course, United Nations resolutions authorizing, or even mandat-
ing, United States commitment of military forces do not, by
themselves, resolve the issue of legality under United States
domestic law.
It would seem then that U.N. or widespread international
support for military operations is desirable, and an aspirational
component of the just war analysis, but it is not a prerequisite to
a just war determination. Further, the morally responsible sol-
dier of the nation about to participate in a military campaign
that is authorized by its constitutional authorities in accordance
with its domestic laws, and ordered by its military leadership,
should feel secure in assuming that such a campaign proceeds
under the mantle of legitimate authority.
II. FIGHTING IN AN UNJUST WAR?
Assuming that a war is unjust, can a soldier, who wants to do
so, legally and morally participate in combat? Legally, the answer
is clearly "yes." In contrast, ethicists and religious institutions
have not achieved a clear consensus of opinion, but so long as
the he or she fights the war properly, the soldier participating in
such a war should be viewed as doing so with a clean moral slate.
A. International Law Permits Participation
International law's closest analogue to an unjust war is a war
of aggression, also known as a crime against peace or a crime of
aggression. Indeed, one commentator characterized the post-
World War II effort to outlaw aggression as "a secular reinterpre-
Hussein from power and abolish that country's nuclear, chemical and biologi-
cal weaponry.").
166. Although most members of Congress initially supported President
Truman's decision to commit military forces to South Korea, Truman never
requested a congressional resolution authorizing or supporting his actions.
MAcDONALD, supra note 160, at 31.
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tation of the just and unjust war doctrine." '16 7 For individuals,
the legal offense was created at the end of World War II, and
several Nazi andJapanese leaders were subjected to trial for such
a crime.
The 1945 Charter of the International Tribunal at Nurem-
berg defined the offense as: "planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war of violation of interna-
tional treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy [to do so]."6' The crime was con-
troversial when first created and remains so today.16 9 Although
the international community had attempted to outlaw war in the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the Pact "only rendered aggression
an illegal act for States, not a criminal act for which individuals
could be tried." 7 ° The most frequent criticism of the individual
convictions for crimes of aggression was that the offense was
applied ex post facto.1 71 In 1946, the United Nations passed a res-
olution affirming the legal principles established by both the tri-
bunal's charter and judgment that aggressive war was a crime;
however, that body has since failed to formally codify aggressive
wars as a criminal offense.
1 7 2
At least with respect to aggressive wars, international law
appears to permit individual participation, extending its punitive
arm to those who plan such wars, but not to the foot soldier
ordered by the State to participate in it.17 The crime of aggres-
sion is committed only by high-level policy makers and not by
167. MAcUIRE, supra note 133, at 83.
168. Steven R. Ratner, Crimes Against Peace, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNow 109 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999); see also Con-
trol Counsel Law No. 10, art. 1(1) (a), Crimes Against Peace, reprinted in 10
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at xix (1951).
169. Ratner, supra note 168, at 109 ("The idea of charging the Nazis with
the crime of starting World War II was controversial at the time and has
remained so ever since.").
170. Id.
171. James Podgers, Remembering Nuremberg, ABAJ., Oct. 1993, at 88, 91
("[Former American war crimes prosecutor Telford] Taylor acknowledges lin-
gering unease about the fact that the aggressive war charge raised fundamental
ex post facto issues, since aggressive war was not articulated as a crime until the
end of the war.").
172. Id. at 92 (" [W] hile recognizing the conceptual illegality of aggressive
war, the UN has yet to codify it as a crime.").
173. See Maj. Michael A. Carlino, The Moral Limits of Strategic Attack, 32
PARAMETERS 15, 17 (2002) ("[Clombatants are not considered criminals for
fighting in a war even if they are fighting for the 'wrong side,' since they are not
responsible for the jus ad bellum decision.").
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soldiers and their commanders. 74 Indeed, in the wake of World
War II, it was only Hitler's inner circle-not lower-level com-
manders or common soldiers-who were called to task for wag-
ing aggressive war.
175
In the High Command case, the American Military Tribunal
limited responsibility for wars of aggression to those "individuals
at the policy-making level."176 The tribunal did not define pre-
cisely who those criminally responsible individuals were, but it
did draw "the boundary between the criminal and the excusable
participation in the waging of an aggressive war" Pt a point well
beyond that of "the common soldier. 1 77
Similarly, in the Krupp case, Judge Anderson noted that the
crime of waging an aggressive war was concerned "not with fight-
ing a war but with promoting one" and that "a line officer per-
forming strictly tactical duties" was not the object of such a
charge.'17  Further, Judge Anderson opined:
[O]nce the war has begun, a different case is presented
insofar as crimes against the peace are concerned. I do not
believe there was or is any law requiring that a citizen not
privy to the prewar plans, but who after the war has begun
is called upon to aid in the war effort, must determine in
advance and at his peril whether the war is ajustifiable one
and refuse his aid if he concludes that it was not. A con-
trary view would have no support in the usage and customs
174. WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TvRANN, ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT NUREM-
BERG 534 (1995) ("This crime cannot reach beyond the heads of states and
those who knowingly join with them in making the political decisions for war.
Military leaders, and others who do not share in that responsibility, should not
be charged with crime for doing their part in support of their country at war,
even if the war was commenced wrongfully and is in fact illegal.").
175. Four German military leaders were "convicted of initiating and wag-
ing wars of aggression," and one (Doenitz) was convicted of waging an aggres-
sive war. Goering, more politician than professional soldier, commanded the
Air Force; Keitel was Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces; Jodl
was Chief of Staff of the High Command; Doenitz commanded the submarine
force and later the German Navy; and Raeder commanded the Navy until
replaced by Doenitz. Id. at 532.
176. United States v. Von Leeb, reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10, at 462, 486 (1950).
177. Id.
178. United States v. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (Anderson,J, con-
curing), reprinted in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILI-
TARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, at 452, 453 (1950)
[hereinafter "Krupp Case"].
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of nations and certainly none in the experience of the peo-
ples of all countries. 1
7 9
As a matter of law then, soldiers are not criminally responsi-
ble for fighting in support of an illegal war, assuming that their
wartime conduct is otherwise proper.
B. The Position of Ethicists and Just War Theorists
At least with regard to aggressive wars, the law and most reli-
gions agree in principle in their general condemnation of wars of
aggression."' 0 During World War II, Pope Pius XII "stated
explicitly the immorality of 'wars of aggression as a legitimate
solution of international disputes and as an instrument of
national aspirations." 1 8 1 Further, the general condemnation of
wars of aggression is not limited to Christianity. The Qur'an
states, "Fight for the sake of Allah those that fight against you,
but do not attack them first. Allah does not love the
aggressor. "s2
Similar to the position taken by the law, many ethicists and
just war theorists properly opine that the general condemnation
of aggressive wars does not extend to the individual soldier par-
ticipating in it. Further, some ethicists put soldiers on both sides
of such a conflict on the same moral plain. Professor Michael
Walzer in his seminal book Just and Unjust Wars, when evaluating
the justness of how the war is fought (jus in bello), as opposed to
the rationale for the State's military action (jus ad bellum),
opined:
[W] e abstract from all consideration of the justice of the
cause. We do this because the moral status of individual
soldiers on both sides is very much the same: they are led
to fight by their loyalty to their own states and by their law-
ful obedience. They are most likely to believe that their
wars are just, and while the basis of that belief is not neces-
sarily rational inquiry but, more often, a kind of unques-
tioning acceptance of official propaganda, nevertheless
they are not criminals; they face one another as moral
equals. "'s
179. Id. at 449.
180. See McCormick, supra note 90, at 803 ("Thus it would seem that (1)
wars of aggression, whether just or unjust, are immoral ... .
181. Id.
182. KORAN 2:190, at 352 (NJ. Dawood trans., 1974).
183. WALZER, supra note 104, at 127; see also Carlino, supra note 173, at 17
(positing that members of the military "operate on a good-faith principle
regarding their country's intentions .... [T]he moral responsibility of engag-
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Augustine appears to have taken a similar position, writing:
"[A] righteous man, serving it may be under an ungodly king,
may do the duty belonging to his position in the State by fighting
by the order of his sovereign,-for in some cases it is plainly the
will of God that he should fight, and in others, where this is not
so plain, it may be an unrighteous command on the part of the
king, while the soldier is innocent, because his position makes
obedience a duty. . . ."" Additionally, although positing that a
war could only be objectively just for one of the warring parties,
both Victoria and Grotius believed that the unjust side, while act-
ing "in good faith under 'invincible ignorance' either of fact or
of law," could also subjectively view their cause as just.1 85
However, the moral and ethical latitude afforded soldiers in
this area appears premised on their belief, or at least uncertainty,
as to the justness of the war.186 Accordingly, it remains uncertain
whether these ethicists and theorists would afford such latitude
to soldiers who knowingly fight in a clearly unjust war. Some
ethicists still would excuse-at least in part-soldiers who know-
ingly fight in an unjust war on the grounds that they have little
choice on the matter.1
8 7
There are significant practical advantages to having the mor-
ally responsible, professional soldier participating in a war of
questionable morality, or even in an unjust war. It is far better
for all concerned-the hapless civilian, captured enemy combat-
ant, or conscript-to have war's hostilities managed by a profes-
sional soldier committed to following the laws of war and mired
in institutional norms of duty, honor, and morality."' 8 Anecdotal
evidence shows that atrocities are most prone to occur when
ing in war is a jus ad bellum issue resting squarely with the political authorities of
the state ... and not with the soldiers prosecuting it.").
184. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 46, at 165.
185. DINSTEIN, supra note 2, at 62.
186. See, e.g., Carlino, supra note 173, at 17 ("[S]ervice members operate
on a good-faith principle regarding their country's intentions ....").
187. See David R. Mapel, Realism and the Ethics of War and Peace, in THE
ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 67 (Terry Nardin ed., 1996) ("Many soldiers have
been forced to fight, and are therefore at least partially absolved of moral
responsibility for the justice of their cause."); cf. H. Richard Niebuhr, War As the
Judgment of God, reprinted in WAR As CRUCIFIXION 20 (2002) (treating "humble
obedient soldiers" as one of many victims of war).
188. During the first Gulf War, General McCaffrey, commander of the
twenty-fourth Infantry Division, directed that any soldier who committed a war
crime would be sent "to the rear in disgrace." McCaffrey posited that if a sol-
dier "mistreated prisoners, civilians, or property, we would not allow you the
honorof continuing to fight." Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, Role of the Armed Forces in
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 149 MIL. L. REv. 229, 236 (1995)
(emphasis added). I do not suggest that the first Gulf War was in any way
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poorly trained or ill disciplined soldiers are commanded by sub-
standard leaders.' 8 9 Even if this country were to become
involved in a war of questionable morality, the American people
and their clergy should encourage, if not insist upon, leaders of
the highest caliber being entrusted with the lives of their sons
and daughters and the safety of property and noncombatants on
the battlefield. It is when the war is unpopular and/or contro-
versial that the potential for atrocities increases and the need for
quality military leadership is most keenly required.
Indeed, merely because a war is unpopular, censured by the
clergy, or even deemed unjust, does not mean that it will not be
fought and that otherwise morally blameless individuals will be
compelled to participate in it. Under such circumstances, the
morally responsible soldier may feel obligated, both profession-
ally and morally, to provide quality leadership and ensure that
hostilities are conducted legally. The soldier is no less the just
warrior for participating in such a war when doing so with honor-
able intent. Further, so long as the soldier follows the recog-
nized rules of armed conflict, the taking of life is morally
permissible. Any moral sanction associated with the conduct of
hostilities in an unjust war should be leveled at the public offi-
cials who are responsible for the war, rather than against the oth-
erwise just warrior.
III. CAN You REFUSE To FIGHT IN AN UNJUST WAR?
Earlier, this Article examined the legal and religious views
toward the soldier who desired to participate in an unjust war.
Now I would like to look at the issue from the opposite side. Can
soldiers legally and morally refuse to fight in a war that they
believe to be unjust when called to arms by their government?
This is probably the area with the greatest disparity between the
views of organized religions and of domestic United States law.
Most religions support a person's refusal to participate in a war
that the individual views as immoral. Although the American
military has attempted to accommodate religion-based refusals to
fight, the scope of this accommodation is decidedly narrower
than what some religions support.
unjust; I merely point out General McCaffrey's attitude as one that society
should seek in its soldiers regardless of the justness of the military conflict.
189. Id. at 235 ("[T] he two most common contributors [to human rights
abuses] are poor leadership and poorly trained or ill-disciplined troops.").
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A. Religious Institutions
Contrary to the position taken by some ethicists, and of
international and American domestic law, many Christian faiths
posit that once a war is determined to be unjust, the soldier can-
not fight in it.19 ° This prohibition may be triggered by an indi-
vidual's subjective determination of unjustness. Most recently,
the Archdiocese for the Military Services reaffirmed this position,
stating: "If a Catholic is utterly convinced in conscience that a
war is unjust and his own role constitutes direct participation in
the effort, he has the right and obligation to object and even
refuse to participate, regardless of the consequences to person
and career. " "'
In a similar vein, the vast majority of Christian religions rec-
ognize the legitimacy of conscientious objection to war in any
form. 19 2 Catholic Catechism 2311 encourages "[p]ublic authori-
ties [to] make equitable provisions for those who for reasons of
190. See COLE, supra note 38, at 78 (arguing that if the just war criteria is
not satisfied, "Christians are forbidden to fight"); id. at 80 ("Christians must say
no to proposed wars in which the people being attacked do not deserve to be
attacked."); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 445, 471 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ("[A] Catholic has a moral duty not to participate in unjust wars.")
(citing from the brief of "an authoritative lay Catholic scholar" who in turn
refers to Pope John XXIII's encyclical PACEM IN TERRmS); cf BAJNTON, supra note
67, at 141 (noting Luther believed "that a private citizen might refuse to serve
in war if he knew the cause to be unjust and opposed to the gospel").
191. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 35. The state-
ment qualified its position by cautioning, "[P]rior to taking such a drastic step, I
vigorously urge any Catholic in such a position to seek out counsel of a Catholic
chaplain." Id.
192. Id. ("If an individual Catholic objects to all war, however, the Church
and our Nation have recognized this as an exception that must be honored, if it
is rooted in authentic conscientious objection and not lesser motives."); Fourth
Churchwide Assembly, Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, supra note 91,
§ 4(B) ("We support members who conscientiously object to bearing arms in
military service."); PRESBYrERANS AND MILITARY SERVICE, supra note 2, at 5 ("The
church also supports conscientious objectors, those who are conscientiously
opposed to participating in war of any form."); Assemblies of God USA, Assem-
blies of God Beliefs: War And Conscientious Objectors, at http://www.ag.org/top/
beliefs/contemporaryjissues/issues 11_war.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) (supporting a
member's decision to declare conscientious objector status); The United Meth-
odist Church, Military Service, at http://www.umc.org/interior.asp?ptid=l&mid=
1830 (last visited June 1, 2004) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy) ("We support and extend the ministry of the Church to
those persons who conscientiously oppose all war .... " (citing THE BOOK OF
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 164(G) (2000))); see also
WINN, supra note 37, at 196 ("Most churches support individual members who
take this position [of refusing to participate in any wars], usually called consci-
entious objection.").
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conscience refuse to bear arms .... ,",' Some churches also sup-
port selective conscientious objection, that is, an objection to a
particular war.1 94
B. Military Law and Conscientious Objectors
1. Partial Accommodation: The Conscientious Objector
Program
Since its very beginning as a nation, the United States has
enjoyed a comparatively laudable history of attempting to accom-
modate conscientious objectors. As the American colonists first
began to take up arms against England, the Continental Con-
gress expressed sympathy openly for pacifists whose religious
principles precluded them from joining the fight.19 5 Exemptions
from conscription for religion-based conscientious objectors
were not uncommon, and at least five of the new states specifi-
cally provided for such exemptions in their constitutions.1 "6 Dur-
193. CATECHISM, supra note 95, at 556. In comparison, Catholicism has
not embraced pacifism; that is, the belief that "war is always wrong." Joseph
Boyle, Just War Thinking in Catholic Natural Law, in THE ETHICS OF WAR AND
PEACE 49 (1996).
194. PRESBYTERIANS AND MILITARY SERVICE, supra note 2, at 7 ("Both the
United Presbyterian Church in the USA... and the Presbyterian Church in the
United States ... supported selective conscientious objection."); Most Reverend
Wilton D. Gregory, President, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Statement On War With Iraq (Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://
www.usccb.org/sdwp/peace/stm31903.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter Statement On War With Iraq]
(reiterating the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops "long-standing support for
those who pursue conscientious objection and selective conscientious objec-
tion"); The United Methodist Church, supra note 192 ("We support... those
persons who conscientiously oppose all war, or any particular war .... ).
195. Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America:
The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 367, 375
(1993). In 1775, on the eve of the American Revolution, the Continental Con-
gress stated: "As there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot
bear arms in any case, the Congress intended no violence to their consciences,
but earnestly recommend it to them, to contribute liberally in this time of uni-
versal calamity, to the relief of their distressed brethren in the several colonies,
and to do all other services to their oppressed Country, which they can consist-
ently with their religious principles." Id. (citation omitted).
196. Id. The five states were Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and New York. Id.; see also Douglas Sturm, Constitutionalism and Con-
scientiousness: The Dignity of Objection to Military Service, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 265, 267
(1983) ("The original colonies and the Continental Congress made special pro-
visions for those 'conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms."') (citation omit-
ted). But cf. Major William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost from the
Vietnam War: Restructuring the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L.
REV. 179, 182 (1993) ("Some colonies excused objectors from compulsory ser-
vice in the militias, while other colonies forced conscientious objectors to
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ing the Civil War, federal law provided conscripts, who were
religion-based conscientious objectors, with alternatives to mili-
tary combatant service.19 7 The Confederate Congress enacted
similar legislation.' 8
As the United States entered World War I, Congress enacted
legislation authorizing conscription, which contained a limited
exemption for those conscientious objectors who were members
of pacifist churches. This exemption allowed them to serve in
noncombatant roles and, later, in agricultural and industrial
positions. 99 The Army expanded the exemption to anyone "who
possessed 'personal scruples against the war"' without requiring
religious-based objections.2"' The expanded Army policy was the
first time that the United States had permitted an exemption for
those whose objections to serving were not rooted in their relig-
ious beliefs. 20 '
On the eve of World War II, Congress passed legislation to
provide for a draft, which contained an exemption for conscript
conscientious objectors.20 2 The legislation extended the consci-
entious objector ("CO") exemption from those who were mem-
bers of pacifist religions to anyone "whose objections were based
on 'religious training and belief,"' provided an appeals proce-
dure for those whose applicants for CO status had been denied
by their local draft boards, and permitted alternative civilian ser-
vice that was not subject to military oversight.20 3 A large number
of conscripts were granted CO status;204 the largest number
choose between fidelity to their religious beliefs and heavy taxes, fines and even
prison.").
197. Sturm, supra note 196, at 267; see also Palmer, supra note 196, at 183
("[E]xemption was limited to only those members of religious denominations
whose religious tenants forbade the bearing of arms and who had conducted
themselves in a manner consistent with such beliefs.").
198. Palmer, supra note 196, at 183-84.
199. Id. at 184.
200. Id. (citation omitted).
201. Id. ("This was the first-and, until the Supreme Court interpreted
the exemption broadly beginning in the 1960s, the only-example of the fed-
eral government granting an exemption to conscientious objectors whose
objections may not have been based on religious belief.").
202. Id. (citing the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L.
No. 76-783, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889). The Act contained no provisions for
conscientious objectors already in the military. Id.
203. Id. at 185.
204. Depending upon the source of information, the number of those
granted CO status varies. Compare Palmer, supra note 196, at 185
(" [A] pproximately 72,000 received, or were eligible for, conscientious objector
status."), with H.A. Freeman, Conscientious Objectors, Legal Aspects (U.S.), in 4 NEw
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 206 (1967) ("Approximately 170,000 were classified as
conscientious objectors.").
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being Methodists and Jehovah's Witnesses, but Protestants and
Catholics received exemptions as well. 0 5
Modeled after the 1940 Act, the Selective Service Act of 1948
was the United States' first true peacetime draft.2 6 The 1948 Act
contained the earlier conscientious objector exemption, but
expansively defined "religious belief and training" to include "an
individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation ... "207
During the Korean War, Congress passed the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 1951, which amended the 1948 Act,
but which also retained the conscientious objector exemption.
20 8
Significantly, it was not until the Korean War that the Ameri-
can military began to accommodate in-service conscientious
objectors. In June 1951, the Defense Department issued a direc-
tive permitting reassignments for conscientious objectors into
noncombatant positions. 2 9 This directive was a watershed event
for members of the armed forces who developed moral objec-
tions to serving in combat after they had entered military service.
As one legal commentator noted, "Neither the current draft law,
nor any of its predecessors, ever provided a means for the soldier
serving on active duty to apply for a change in duties or a dis-
charge because of his or her conscientious objections to contin-
ued military service."21 0 Similarly, the current version of the
Department of Defense's directive on point provides for dis-
charge or reassignment to noncombatant duties of service mem-
bers who become conscientious objectors after entering military
service."'
However, the United States military's conscientious objector
program is not designed to accommodate those individual ser-
vice members who object to a particular military campaign.
Department of Defense Directive 1300.6, Conscientious Objec-
tors, states: "An individual who desires to choose the war in
which he will participate is not a Conscientious Objector under
the law. His objection must be to all wars rather than a specific
205. Freeman, supra note 204, at 206.
206. Palmer, supra note 196, at 185.
207. Id. (citing Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat.
604, 612-13).
208. Id. (citing Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub.
L. No. 81-51, § 6(j), 65 Stat. 75).
209. Id. at 186 (citing U.S. Dep't of Def., Directive No. 1315.1 Uune 18,
1951)).
210. Id.
211. U.S. Dep't. of Def., Directive No. 1300.6, Conscientious Objector,
§§ 4.1, 4.2, 6.1, 7.1 (Aug. 20, 1971) (incorporating through change four, Sept.
11, 1975) [hereinafter DODD 1300.6].
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war." 212 Service regulations contain similar definitional restric-
tions. For example, the relevant Army Regulation states,
"[R]equests by personnel for qualification as a conscientious
objector after entering military service will not be favorably con-
sidered when these requests are .. . (4) Based on objection to a
certain war."2 1 "A person who desires to choose the war in
which he or she will participate is not a conscientious objector
under this regulation. 2 1
4
2. Punitive Domestic Law: Where Accommodation Ends
For those members of the armed forces charged with crimes
associated with the refusal to participate in military campaigns,
published case law in both the federal and military legal systems
have uniformly rejected defenses based on the illegality or immo-
rality of the war." 5 Further, courts have treated challenges to
the legality of presidential orders deploying our military forces as
a nonjusticiable political question." 6 The following discussion
of two cases, Gillette and Huet-Vaughn, illustrates the limits of
accommodation that the law is willing to make for conscientious
objection to participation in specific military campaigns.
a. Federal Law: The Gillette Case
During the Vietnam War, several Christians claimed selec-
tive conscientious objection to the conflict on just war
grounds.2 y One such case eventually made its way to the United
212. Id. § 5.2.1.
213. U.S. Dep't of the Army, Regulation, No. 600-43, Conscientious
Objectors, 1.7(a)(4) (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Army Reg. 600-43].
214. Id. Glossary.
215. See, e.g., Associated Press, Judge Won't Dismiss Desertion Charge, MILI-
TARY.COM, May 20, 2004, at http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,
FL desert 052004,00.html?ESRC=eb.nl (on file with the Notre DameJournal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy) (explaining a ruling by a military judge that evi-
dence of illegal or immoral treatment of Iraqi prisoners was "irrelevant" to a
desertion charge against a soldier who failed to return to his unit in Iraq); cf
United States v. Owens, 415 F.2d 1308, 1313, 1316 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding that
the alleged illegality of American conduct in Vietnam and "purity of motive"
are no defense to refusal to be inducted into the armed forces).
216. Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 512-14 (D.D.C. 1990) (involving an
order to deploy to the Persian Gulf); United States v. New, 55 MJ. 95, 109
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (involving an order to deploy to Macedonia); see also United
States v. Rockwood, 48 MJ. 501, 507 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1998) ("The legality
of the employment of military forces is not reviewable by the judiciary."), affd,
52 MJ. 98 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
217. WOGAMAN, supra note 88, at 349 (finding that the use of the just war
doctrine as the basis for selective conscientious objection to a war has generally
been rejected by courts in the United States and abroad).
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States Supreme Court. In Gillette v. United States,21 s a "devout"
Catholic soldier, Negre, who came to believe that Vietnam was an
unjust war after completing infantry training, sought a writ of
habeas corpus after unsuccessfully attempting to obtain a dis-
charge from the Army as a conscientious objector.2 19 After the
district court had denied the writ, and the appellate court
affirmed, the United States Supreme Court considered "whether
conscientious objectors to a particular war, rather than objection
to war as such, relieves the objector from responsibilities of mili-
tary training and service. "220
After first pointing out that it had no doubt as to the sincer-
ity of Negre's belief that as a Catholic he could not participate in
what he considered to be an unjust war, the Court nevertheless
affirmed.2 2' Applying the same standard to both pre-induction
objectors and in-service objectors, the Court interpreted the con-
scientious objection provision of Military Service Act of 1967,222
and the Services' implementing regulations, "to exempt persons
who oppose participating in all war-'participation in war in any
form'-and that persons who object solely to participation in a
particular war are not within the purview of the exempting sec-
tion . "..."223 Further, the Court posited that only those who
objected to war in any form could qualify as a conscientious
objector even though their objection to a particular war "may
have such roots in a claimant's conscience and personality that is
'religious' in character. '"224
The Court also rejected a First Amendment challenge to the
limitation on the conscientious objector exemption to those who
are opposed to all wars. The petitioners argued that the failure
to exempt selective objectors from military service violated the
218. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
219. Id. at 441-42. A second petitioner, Gillette, challenged his convic-
tion for failing to report for induction. Gillette also believed the war unjust and
claimed conscientious status. His moral objection to the war was not rooted in
religion but, rather, was "based on a humanist approach to religion." Id. at 440.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 441 ("[N]o question is raised as to the sincerity or the religious
quality of this petitioner's views.").
222. The provision stated, "Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be
construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service
in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Id.
at 442 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. 456(j) (Supp. V 1964)).
223. Id. at 449. The Court clarified its holding by noting that the willing-
ness to use force to defend oneself, home, family or against acts of violence
against others, was not inconsistent with being a conscientious objector to war
in any form. Id. at 448.
224. Id. at 447.
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Establishment and Free Exercise clauses when the objection was
"religious or conscientious in nature."2 ' The Court initially
found the establishment argument flawed, noting that the statute
on its face did not afford special treatment to any specific relig-
ion or religious organization.22 6
The Court continued, however, and addressed the argument
that a "de facto discrimination among religions" was affected
because members of faiths that follow the just war theory cannot
object to all wars; they can only object to those that are unjust.227
The Court found that the Government had a neutral, secular
basis for drawing this distinction, because of its pragmatic consid-
erations "such as the hopelessness of converting a sincere consci-
entious objector into an effective fighting man," and because the
CO exemption "focused on individual conscientious belief'-
objection to all war-rather than on "secular affiliation" or
"adherence to any extraneous theological viewpoint.122 1 Plaintiff
could not establish that the Military Service Act "intrude[d]
upon 'voluntarism' in religious life," was intended to "promote
or foster those religious organizations that traditionally have
taught the duty to abstain from participation in any war," or
"encourage[d] membership in putatively 'favored' religious
organizations .... "229
Finally, the Court determined that the United States had
"valid neutral reasons ... for limiting the exemption to objectors
to all wars .... ,230 Beyond the general need for manpower, the
Court accepted the Government's argument that an expansion
of the CO exemption to include selective objectors would endan-
ger fairness in the process by which the United States deter-
mined who must serve in the military.23 1 Claims of selective
objection were "intrinsically ... of uncertain dimension," could
be supported by a "limitless variety of beliefs" or other subjective
variables, many of which might be indistinguishable from politi-
cal, non-conscientious objections, or could be so fact specific that
the objection could be readily susceptible to change or nullifica-
tion.2 32 Further, the Court recognized the legitimacy of various
perceived dangers associated with permitted selective objection,
such as the potential to "weaken the resolve" of conscripts willing
225. Id. at 448.
226. Id. at 450-51.
227. Id. at 451-52.
228. Id. at 452-54.
229. Id. at 454.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 455.
232. Id.
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to serve in the military despite the attendant hardships and their
personal reservations, and undercutting our democratic system
of government by which individuals subordinate their interests to
the public good as determined by our elected officials.
233
b. Military Law: Captain Huet-Vaughn
The Uniform Code of Military Justice 23 4 provides a number
of provisions to punish the refusal of service members to partici-
pate in military campaigns, including most commonly Articles 85
(Desertion), 86 (Absent Without Leave), and 87 (Missing Move-
ment).115 During the first Gulf War's Operation Desert Shield/
Storm, a number of service members were convicted of various
military offenses associated with their refusal to participate in
that conflict, despite their assertion that they were conscientious
objectors.23 6 Although the incident rate seems lower than dur-
ing the first Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom also resulted in
similar courts-martial.
237
One highly publicized case involved the court-martial of
Captain Yolanda M. Huet-Vaughn. The accused, 23 8 a physician,
had re-joined the Army Reserve in order to satisfy a military com-
mitment she assumed in medical school, to perform public ser-
vice, and "to gain credibility in her political activism. " 239 At the
time she entered the Army Reserve, she was aware of, and
233. Id. at 459-60.
234. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
235. 10 U.S.C. §§ 885-887 (2000).
236. See, e.g., Margaret Roth, Soldiers Go AWOL to Avoid Gulf War; Others
Forced to Go, ARMY TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at 61 (reporting a soldier who unsuc-
cessfully attempted to apply for CO status after his unit was alerted for deploy-
ment, refused to participate in deployment, and was convicted, imprisoned,
and sentenced to a bad conduct discharge); Conscientious Objector Sentenced,
WASH. PosT, May 24, 1991, at A24. A Marine who claimed CO status was sen-
tenced to four months incarceration for "missing his unit's activation"; six other
Marines were found guilty of desertion and sentenced to various periods of
incarceration. Id.
237. See, e.g., Split Decision on Marine Objector, Reservist Innocent of Desertion,
Will Do TimeforAbsence, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2003, at A27 (Marine Reserv-
ist who failed to report for duty, claiming he was a conscientious objector, con-
victed of unauthorized absence. In comparison, twenty-seven other Marines
who declared they were also conscientious objectors, but still reported for duty,
were not prosecuted).
238. Within the military justice system, an "accused" is the equivalent of
the civilian term "defendant."
239. United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 108 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
Prior to rejoining the Army Reserve in June 1990, Huet-Vaughn had served in
the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Public Health Service. Id. She
had initially joined the Army Reserve while a medical student. Margaret Traud,
Deserter, Freed, Faces New Battles, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 12, 1992, at 16.
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opposed to, earlier military action in Panama and against
Libya.2 4 ° Despite her reservations about supporting Operation
Desert Shield, Huet-Vaughn complied with her orders to report
for active duty on December 23, 1990,241 and was subsequently
assigned to a medical unit that was pending deployment to
Southwest Asia.24 2
However, Huet-Vaughn then absented her unit on Decem-
ber 31st and publicly protested the upcoming war.243 At a news
conference, she stated, "I am refusing orders to be an accomplice
in what I consider an immoral, inhumane and unconstitutional
act .. .. 24 While she was absent, her unit deployed to Saudi
Arabia. 245 After returning to military control on February 2, she
filed for conscientious objector status. 24 6
Slightly more than a month after she returned to the Army,
military authorities preferred charges against her, ultimately
resulting in a conviction, pursuant to Article 85, for "desertion
with the intent to avoid hazardous duty and shirk important ser-
vice .... ,,247 The panel (military jury) sentenced Huet-Vaughn
to be dismissed from the Army, to forfeit all pay and allowances,
and to be confined for thirty months.2 48 Her confinement was
reduced as an act of clemency to fifteen months. Later, she was
released after approximately eight months confinement.2 49
On appeal, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review
("ACMR") reversed, holding that the military judge erred when
he precluded the defense from contesting the specific intent ele-
ment of the desertion charge through the presentation of evi-
240. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. at 108.
241. Id.
242. United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 39 M.J. 545, 548 (A.C.M.R. 1994),
rev'd, 43 M.J. 105 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
243. Kimberly J. McLarin, For Resisters, Gulf War Continues, PHiuA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 16, 1992, at 1-A ("Huet-Vaughn fled to the East Coast and began
a whirlwind tour of speeches, rallies and appearances decrying the coming
war."); 39 M.J. at 548 (absented unit on December 31st).
244. Doctor Refuses Army Reserve Duty Orders, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1991, at
A24.
245. McLarin, supra note 243. Her unit, the 410th Evacuation Hospital,
deployed to Saudia Arabia on January 27, 1991, to a location thirty miles south
of the Iraqi border. 39 M.J. at 548 n.3. CPT Huet-Vaughn never alleged that
she was unaware that her unit was about to deploy at the time she left it. 43 M.J.
at 113.
246. McLarin, supra note 243.
247. 39 M.J. at 547.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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dence concerning the accused's motive for leaving her unit.
2 50
The military judge had ruled that " [t] o consciously, intentionally
quit one's unit to avoid hazardous duty and/or important service
because of one's conscience, religion, or personal philosophies is
not a defense." 251  However, the military judge had permitted
Huet-Vaughn to briefly testify at trial about her motivations for
leaving her unit, her objections to the war, and her belief that
obeying the order to deploy to the Persian Gulf would have been
immoral, 252 and the judge further ruled that she was permitted
"to testify without limitation on her intentions" during the court-
martial's sentencing phase.
2 13
Huet-Vaughn posited that her intent was not "'to avoid haz-
ardous duty and shirk important service.' Rather, her intent was
solely to expose to the public the war crime nature of the
impending Persian Gulf war." 5 4 Additionally, she wanted to pre-
sent evidence concerning her belief that war crimes would be
committed and that she was legally justified in refusing to serve
in the war by virtue of the Nuremberg Principles and Army Field
Manual 27-10, Law of Land Warfare. 25 ' Huet-Vaughn believed
"that support of the war would be morally and ethically
wrong.
256
Recognizing that a distinction existed between intent and
motive, 257 and reaffirming that "evidence of motive is not an
affirmative defense to desertion, [the ACMR nevertheless con-
cluded that] it may be considered by the trier of fact to deter-
mine whether the appellant had the specific intent charged in
the desertion offense, i.e. to avoid hazardous duty or shirk impor-
250. Id. at 548. The court determined that the evidence still supported a
conviction of the lesser included offense of Absent Without Leave ("AWOL").
Id. at 555.
251. Id. at 550.
252. Id. at 550-51; 43 M.J. at 113.
253. 39 MJ. at 549. A military court-martial is bifurcated into a guilt/
innocence phase and, if necessary, a sentencing phase.
254. Id.
255. Id. She also argued that such testimony was relevant to a mistake of
fact defense.
256. 43 M.J. at 113.
257. 39 M.J. at 552. "Intent refers only to the state of mind when the act
is done" and it may be an element of an offense. Id. In comparison, motive "is
the human emotion which incites, stimulates, or prompts a person to act, and is
the reason for a person's behavior." Id. Motive is not an essential element of
an offense, but "motive may be considered ... in determining the person's
intent." Id. "If a person does an act which the law denounces as a crime,
motive is immaterial, except insofar as evidence of motive may aid the trier of
fact to determine the accused's intent." Id.
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tant service." 258 However, apparently concerned with the poten-
tially far reaching implications of its holding, the ACMR moved
to temper the impact of its decision. The court noted that even
if Huet-Vaughn had been able to present evidence concerning
her motivations for quitting her unit, the trier of fact was still free
to reject such evidence and convict her of desertion.2 59 Further,
the court cautioned, "It would be error to read our decision to
mean that soldiers are now free to pick and choose which wars or
battles to fight."2 6 The court's decision did not "create a new
affirmative defense to a charge of desertion predicated on a sol-
dier's 'anti-war,' 'immoral war,' 'illegal war,' 'unnecessary war'
sentiments or 'public health,' 'preventive medicine,' 'humanita-
rian,' or 'moral' views. 26 1
On appeal, 6 2 the United States Court of Military Appeals("COMA") set aside the decision of the ACMR and affirmed the
conviction of the Army captain. The COMA distinguished
between intent and motive, finding that evidence of the latter
was simply irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible. 26 ' Accordingly,
"[t]o the extent that CPT Huet-Vaughn quit her unit as a gesture
of protest, her motive for protesting was irrelevant." 64 Further,
the COMA posited, "[t]o the extent that CPT Huet-Vaughn quit
her unit because of moral or ethical reservations, her beliefs were
irrelevant because they did not constitute a defense. '26 5
The court also addressed Huet-Vaughn's argument that the
order to deploy to the Persian Gulf was illegal. Her "so-called
'Nuremberg defense' applies only to individual acts committed
in wartime; it does not apply to the Government's decision to
wage war." '26 6 Huet-Vaughn, however, had presented no evi-
dence that she had been ordered to engage in conduct constitut-
ing a war crime. 267 Finally, any proffered evidence concerning
the legality of the decision to deploy U.S. forces to Southwest
258. Id. at 554.
259. Id. at 554 n.10.
260. Id. at 554 n.11.
261. Id.
262. United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 MJ. 105 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
263. Id. at 113.
264. Id. at 114.
265. Id. (citing MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV,
para. 14c(2) (a) (iii) (1984) for the proposition that "dictates of a person's con-
science, religion, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedi-
ence of an otherwise lawful order.").
266. Id.
267. Id.
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Asia was irrelevant because the issue was a non-justiciable politi-
cal question.26
8
3. Reform Is Unlikely
Should the United States expand its conscientious objector
exemption to those who object only to specific wars or military
campaigns? In making such a decision, the government must
balance its "interest in granting discharges to sincere conscien-
tious objectors [against its] equal interest in preventing misuse of
these procedures as a backdoor out of military service. '" 9 At
least for in-service objectors, the balance of interests tilts against
expansion of the exemption.
The advantages of extending the current conscientious
objector exemption to in-service objectors who oppose particular
wars are not inconsequential. An expansion of the conscientious
objector exemption would comport with our deep-rooted tradi-
tion of accommodating those members of our citizenry with sin-
cere moral or religious objections to participating in a war.
Adopting such a policy may also generate positive public rela-
tions dividends. Further, there are practical advantages to
allowing a potentially disruptive member of a unit to leave mili-
tary service, or to be reassigned elsewhere, rather than jeopardiz-
ing unit coherence on the battlefield. A soldier who refuses to
fight obviously reduces the combat efficiency of a unit.
However, expanding the military's current conscientious
objector exemption to include objections to specific wars by in-
service objectors contains an obvious potential for abuse.2"'
Insincere objectors could join the military purely for economic
reasons, such as obtaining ajob during difficult economic times;
or join to obtain educational benefits, such as a Reserve Officers
Training Corps ("ROTC") scholarship, academy appointment or
government paid law or medical school, and then declare that
they are opposed to participation in a particular military cam-
paign at the point that their services are most needed. Soldiers
268. Id. at 115 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Ange v.
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 518 n.8 (D.D.C. 1990)).
269. Roby v. United States Dep't of Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir.
1996) (quoting Sanger v. Seamans, 507 F.2d 814, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1974)).
270. See R.T. Powers, Conscientious Objectors, in 4 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLO-
PEDIA 205 (1967) ("Some men try to avoid these obligations by reasons that are
selfish or cowardly."); cf Marc Fisher, The Army's Conscientious Question, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 1991, at DI ("Army spokesman .. .said claims received in recent
weeks are generally not the result of serious philosophical objections to the war.
'All of a sudden, when there's a chance of hostilities, they're conscientious
objectors?' he said. 'I don't think so.'").
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may elect to avoid combat, not because of any religious scruples,
but because of a desire to avoid the attendant hardships and dan-
gers of combat 27 ' or to pursue more lucrative opportunities in
the civilian job market.
Additionally, a significant administrative burden is placed
on the unit whenever a service member seeks conscientious
objector status. The commander of a unit receiving an applica-
tion for CO status must arrange for an interview of the applicant
by a chaplain, who must submit a detailed report to the com-
mander, and by a psychiatrist, who must also generate a report.
The commander must then forward the information to a higher-
level commander, who will appoint an investigating officer.27 2
The Investigating Officer ("t") must gather information "from
commanders, supervisors, records, and any other sources" and
then conduct a hearing, which may include witnesses from the
applicant's unit.27 The 10 must prepare a report for the
appointing commander, which is then routed (after receiving
any rebuttal statement) to the applicant's original commander
for review and recommendation. Ultimately, the report is fur-
ther routed through the applicant's chain of command to a gen-
eral officer for review. 2 7 4 If appropriate, the case file may be
returned to the 10 for additional investigation. 275 Applications
recommended for disapproval are forwarded to the Army's Con-
scientious Objector Review Board for final decision.2 76
This administrative burden can be cumbersome particularly
for a unit preparing to deploy overseas on short notice. The
same unit must also compensate for the actual or potential loss
of one of its number and the concomitant disruption to the
smooth functioning of the unit that such a loss may entail. A
tank crew, infantry squad, or artillery crew that has trained
together for a lengthy period of time may go into combat short-
handed, or while rapidly scrambling to train and integrate any
subsequent replacement. Critical medical personnel may be
absent on the eve of a casualty-intensive military operation.
271. Cf JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 109-10, 117 (telling of a chaplain who
doubts the sincerity of a soldier who seeks to avoid returning to field duty,
claiming to have converted to being a Jehovah's Witness immediately prior to
his arrival in Vietnam).
272. Army Reg. 600-43, supra note 213, 1 2-2-2-4 (1998).
273. Id. 1 2-4, 2-5.
274. Id. 1 2-5, 2-6. The reviewing general officer is the General Court-
Martial Convening Authority. Id. 1 2-6(c), 2-8.
275. Id. 2-6(e).
276. Id. 2-8(a). The Navy follows a similar procedure. See generally Roby
v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052, 1055 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Further, the military must consider the affect on other mem-
bers of that soldier's unit of exempting a recently declared con-
scientious objector from deploying overseas. Morale may be
adversely affected when the remaining members of the unit, who
also have no desire to be separated from their families and thrust
into a hostile environment, see what they perceive as an insincere
objector successfully avoiding wartime service, either by being
granted an undeserved CO exemption or by delaying deploy-
ment through the administrative and judicial process until the
end of hostilities.
IV. WHO DECIDES?
A significant issue arising out of the national debate con-
cerning the United States' military campaign against Iraq was the
proper role of religious authorities in determining not only
whether the war was just, but more importantly, whether they
should (or could) forbid the participation of their congrega-
tions, or permit that decision to be made as a matter of individ-
ual conscience.
As noted in the Introduction, at least two religious leaders
have either reserved or invoked the right to forbid participation
in a military campaign. Such positions appear inconsistent with
the just war concept that the decision to go to war be made by a
legitimate secular authority. Further, the invocation of any such
authority would be both unwise as a matter of policy and unfair
as a matter of application.
The just war doctrine envisions that the ultimate determina-
tion of whether a moral basis exists to go to war resides in the
first instance with secular public officials and not members of the
clergy.27 7 Catholic Catechism 2309 provides, "The evaluation of
these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudent
judgment of those who have responsibility for the common
good."2 7 This passage indicates that it is the secular leader who
277. See Baer, supra note 88, at 6 (noting "the responsibility of our politi-
cal leaders"); Robert Benne, Beware of the Foreign Policy Opinions of Religious Profes-
sionals, J. LUTHERAN ETHICS, Sept. 2002, at *2, http://www.elca.org/scriptlib/
dcs/jle/article.asp?aid=81 (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy) (commenting that it is better to follow the advice of politicians
rather "than that of religious leaders who have neither direct engagement nor
accountability for the consequences of their opinions"); cf COLE, supra note 38,
at 78 (arguing that the proper authority criteria for a just war refers to a
"nation's sovereign leaders").
278. CATECHISM, supra note 95, at 556.
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decides that the moral criteria for a just war has been satisfied. 7 9
Relying on this provision, Catholic ethicist George Weigel
posited:
The meaning of this seems plain. The duty of religious
leaders is to teach the principles of the tradition and urge
that they be brought into public and governmental deliber-
ation about the possible use of armed force in the service
of peace, justice, and freedom; but it is not the duty of
religious leaders to make the call as to whether those crite-
ria have been satisfied in a particular case. That is the pre-
rogative and the duty of those who have taken
responsibility for the common good-public officials. This
duty includes evaluating when the criteria of last resort has
been satisfied.2 8 °
It seems inconsistent to have a component of the just war
doctrine affording such decisional authority to secular leaders
but then permitting religious leaders the authority to mandate
disobedience. If the just war doctrine had envisioned such eccle-
siastic power, the legitimate authority prong would include both
a secular and religious component, which it does not.
In a similar vein, uniquely American sensitivities counsel
against proclamations by American religious leaders forbidding
participation in particular military campaigns. Such dictates
would intrude on the delicate balance between Church and State
that exists in this country. Forbidding all or a large portion of
the two-thirds of the armed forces that describe themselves as
Christian from participating in military operations, ordered pur-
suant to lawful constitutional authority, would have the effect of
religious leaders assuming the mantle of governmental authority
and, in effect, dictating American foreign policy-an area
beyond their basic field of competency.
As explained in greater detail below, the better position is
that the decision whether to participate in a questionable war
should remain a matter of individual conscience, guided-but
not dictated-by the clergy. Some support may be found for this
279. Novak, supra note 89 ("[Tlhe final judgment belongs to public
authorities."); see Statement On War With Iraq, supra note 194 ("We understand
and respect the difficult moral choices that must be made by our President and
others who bear the responsibility of making these grave decisions involving our
nation's and the world's security.") (citing CATECHiSM No. 2309).
280. George Weigel, Correspondence: George Weigel Replies, FiRST THINGS,
Apr. 2003, at 4.
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approach within various Christian religions 281 and among various
laypersons.2 8 2
The reasons for allowing the decision to participate in a
questionable war to be made by the individual soldier are numer-
ous and varied. First, there will rarely exist a clear, uncontro-
verted factual basis to dispositively declare a war to be unjust.
Rarely are wars clearly unjust. The reasons that nations go to war
are often complex and cases of clear-cut, naked aggression, such
as that exhibited by Nazi Germany or Iraq against Kuwait, are the
exception rather than the norm. Frequently, both sides of a con-
flict believe in the justness of their cause.28 3
Additionally, the factual basis for military action and the cir-
cumstances surrounding specific military conduct are often ini-
tially in dispute or not fully known, particularly by those far
removed from the battlefield. National leaders oftentimes pos-
sess a wealth of information not available to the general pub-
lic,284 including the clergy. For a variety of reasons, such as the
protection of intelligence sources or other classified information,
much of the Government's knowledge may not be disclosed to
the public or to its religious leaders. Also, those facts that are
available may be partially erroneous as well as incomplete, and
an individual's interpretation of the significance of available
information may be influenced by both personal biases and the
281. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 471 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ("No one can tell a Catholic that this or that war is eitherjust or unjust.
This is a personal decision that an individual must make on the basis of his own
conscience after studying the facts."); id. at 473 ("While the fact that the ulti-
mate determination of whether a war is unjust rests on individual conscience,
the Church has provided guides."); PREsByrERIANS AND MILITARY SERVICE, supra
note 2, at 3 ("Faced with agonizing choices of war, each Christian must satisfy
his or her own conscience under God and before other citizens, that any war is
'just and necessary"'); Assemblies of God USA, supra note 192 (acknowledging
the "right of each member to choose for himself").
282. See Cooperman, supra note 21, at A28 ("Catholics who support the
war say that the church's job is to explain just-war theory, but that applying the
theory is a matter of individual judgment."); cf JAMES H. TONER, TRUE FAITH
AND ALLEGIANCE: THE BURDEN OF MILITARY ETHICS 21, 28 (1995) (opining that a
soldier must decide whether to follow conscience or orders from political/mili-
tary leadership).
283. See, e.g., BYLER, supra note 49, at 12 (noting that during the war
between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands "the clergy of
both countries were routinely claiming the war met all the requirements ofjus-
tifiable war").
284. Cf Powers, supra note 270, at 206 ("Responsible leaders of govern-
ment base defensive policies on economic, political, and technological facts
that are to a large extent hidden from public knowledge.").
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biases of outside influences, 28 5 such as friends, family, profes-
sional commentators or the media.
Vietnam, which was America's most controversial war, serves
in part as an illustration of this point. Initially, America's entry
into Vietnam was looked upon favorably. 28 6 A November 1966
pastoral statement, issued by the American Catholic bishops,
viewed the American presence in Vietnam as an effort to assist
another country "in its struggle against aggression" and opined
that it was "reasonable to argue that our presence in Vietnam is
justified." 28 7 However, eventually the protracted nature of the
conflict and mounting casualties, both civilian and American,
began to erode support for the war.288
By November 1968, the American bishops issued a pastoral
letter questioning "whether 'the conflict in Vietnam [had] pro-
voked inhuman dimensions of suffering"' and questioned the
justness of the war, under the proportionality prong of the just
war criteria, based dubiously on "the financial resources 'inevita-
bly lost to education, poverty relief, and the positive works of
social justice at home and abroad (including Southeast Asia) as a
result of the mounting budgets for this and like military opera-
tions."' Eventually, influential Catholic publications and various
high-ranking Catholic clergy publicly denounced the war, the
policy of Vietnamization, and even specific military operations
such as the 1970 attack on North Vietnamese military bases in
Cambodia. 89
Two factual allegations, among others, arose and became
widely believed among influential Catholic opinion makers and
contributed to the eventual shift of Catholic public opinion
against the war: (1) "that the Viet Cong were an independent
force, not an instrument of North Vietnam" and (2) that Ameri-
can soldiers in Vietnam were "guilty of systematic atrocities and
war crimes.1"290 However, the Viet Cong were supported by and
285. See Henry Brinton, A Congregation Divided on the War, Not Just a Matter
of Practicing What I Preach, WASH. PoSr, Apr. 20, 2003, at B2 (recognizing the
"danger in using theology to justify personal political convictions," finding that
"a political gap often exists between clergy and parishioners," and asserting that
"it's no great secret that clergy in mainline churches tend to be more liberal
theologically and politically than the people in their pews") (citation omitted).
286. G. Lewy, Vietnam War and the Church, in 18 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLO-
PEDIA 535 (1989) ("American Catholic opinion" initially supported the war.).
287. Id. at 536.
288. Id. at 537.
289. Id.
290. Id. The erosion of domestic support for the war was a product of a
number of complex factors during this period of social upheaval (and not lim-
ited to these two examples).
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received direction from North Vietnam.2 9 1 Indeed, following the
unsuccessful Tet Offensive in 1968, Viet Cong units were staffed
largely by North Vietnamese.2 92
Further, while American soldiers did engage in some war
crimes, and the incidents of such criminality appear to have been
underreported,293 American forces generally behaved honorably
while fighting in Vietnam. More to the point, the misconduct of
American forces in Vietnam never rose to the levels alleged by
the antiwar community. 29 4 One prominent historian, Guenter
Lewy, has been particularly critical of Vietnam-era "American
Catholic opinion leaders" for falling prey to communist propa-
ganda and for ignoring communist misconduct and the likely
consequences of a North Vietnamese victory.29 5 Lewy admon-
ished: "The moral calculus employed by the American bishops
can be faulted because of empirical errors-the reliance on
incorrect factual information concerning the American war
291. In 1959, Hanoi authorized military action in the South and sent
90,000 Vietminh soldiers in support. The following year, "at Hanoi's direction,
the southern revolutionaries, called 'Vietcong' ('VC') by the Saigon govern-
ment, created the National Liberation Front . . . ." MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, THE
VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL 8 (2002); see also Lewy, supra note 286, at 538 (Following
their 1975 victory in Vietnam, North Vietnamese leaders acknowledged that the
Viet Cong "was created by the Communist party of Vietnam.").
292. BELKNAP, supra note 291, at 45 ("After the Vietcong suffered heavy
casualties in early 1968, these local recruits were increasingly supplemented
with infiltrators from the North. Some Main Force regiments became as much
as 70 percent North Vietnamese."); see DON OBERDORFER, TET! 329 (1971)
("The Viet Cong lost the best of a generation of resistance fighters, and after
Tet increasing numbers of North Vietnamese had to be sent south to fill the
ranks.").
293. See LErwv, supra note 17, at 347 ("[I]t is apparent that the rules for
reporting war crimes were often violated."); cf BELKNAP, supra note 291, at 48
("[F]ar more [war crimes] went unpunished.").
294. Lewy, supra note 286, at 538 ("The record certainly does not bear
out accusations of genocide and of the wholesale, willful violations of the law of
war, the kinds of charges which led well-meaning American Catholics, their
bishops among them, to conclude that nothing could be worse than a continua-
tion of the war."); cf MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM,
1964-1973, at 77 (Vietnam Studies 1975) ("Most [war crimes] were isolated
incidents, offenses committed by individual U.S. soldiers or small groups.").
295. Lewy, supra note 286, at 538. For a discussion of the repression
inflicted on the Catholic church in South Vietnam following the communist
takeover, see generally id. at 539-40; cf. S.A. Miller, Expatriates Mark Fall of Sai-
gon, Say Abuses Continue in Vietnam, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at B1 ("They've
locked up priests. They've locked up monks. There are thousands imprisoned
in gulags.") (citation omitted).
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effort-as well as because of insufficient awareness of the human
cost of a communist victory. '"296
Second, it is patently unfair to the individual soldier to for-
bid participation in a particular military campaign absent the
most clear-cut, compelling factual circumstances. Members of
the American armed forces take an oath upon entering the mili-
tary. Officers swear to "support and defend the Constitution of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic" as
well as to "well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office
upon which [they] enter .... "1297 Enlisted members of the mili-
tary also swear to support and defend the Constitution as well as
to "obey the orders of the President of the United States and the
orders of the officers appointed over me .... ,298 Indeed, it is a
foundational professional precept of the American armed forces
that they will follow the lawful orders of their military superiors
and of the nation's civilian leadership.2 9 9 As one military ethicist
posited: "No stronger principle of American civil-military rela-
tions exists than this: In the United States, the professional mili-
tary is wholly subsidiary to the civilians elected to high office in
our republic."3 ' This "principle of civilian control is
"1301sacrosanct ....
Further, unlike their civilian contemporaries, for the soldier
the decision to participate in a war is dictated by the authority of
the State. Most members of the armed forces have little, if any,
input in this decision.
There are serious ramifications for the individual soldier
who refuses or avoids combat duty. The refusal to fight can
result in a court-martial, with resultant incarceration, fines, and
ignoble discharge. Lesser forms of adverse administrative action
296. Lewy, supra note 286, at 540; cf Benne, supra note 277, at *1 (finding
that, historically, certain "Protestant religious intellectuals and church leaders"
have frequently had "too benign an assessment of the 'opposition' ...."). Lewy
also charges that the American bishops misapplied the principle of proportion-
ality by failing to properly consider "the importance of foreseeable geopolitical
consequences such as the establishment of the powerful Russian naval base at
Cam Ranh Bay ... " Lewy, supra note 286, at 540.
297. LTC (RET.) LAWRENCE P. CROCKER, ARMY OFFICER'S GUIDE 17 (46th
ed., 1993).
298. TONER, supra note 282, at vii.
299. See CROCKER, supra note 297, at 22 ("The very foundation of the
officer's code, the basic principle, is that all members of the Army accept and
do their best to act upon all orders and missions directed to them by the Presi-
dent, within his authority under the Constitution. In practice, this means
accepting also all orders and missions assigned by others lawfully appointed to
positions of authority over the Army members.").
300. TONER, supra note 282, at 34.
301. Id. at 36.
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will ruin that soldier's career. Even the development of an unfa-
vorable professional reputation may serve as a career death knell.
For many in the military, the loss of their career is much more
than the loss of a job. It represents losing something more akin
to a vocation or calling, such is the profound sense of duty that
many in the American armed forces hold dear.
For the morally responsible soldier, an open conflict
between our civilian and religious leaders risks placing the sol-
dier in the unenviable position of having to choose between God
and country. As one Presbyterian Minister, whose congregation
included members of the military, noted during the national
debate concerning the justness of the recent invasion of Iraq:
"[T] he widespread religious opposition to invasion can put mem-
bers of my parish in a tough spot, especially military officers, who
are accountable to the chain of command and ultimately to the
commander in chief."
30 2
The United States government's reasons for entering mili-
tary operations enjoy a reputable presumption of legitimacy that
the American soldier should be able to rely upon.30 3 In his
March 25, 2003, message to Catholics serving in the armed
forces, Bishop O'Brien, Archbishop for the Military Services,
wrote: "Given the complexity of factors involved, many of which
understandably remain confidential, it is altogether appropriate
for members of our armed forces to presume the integrity of our
leadership and its judgments and therefore to carry out their
duties in good conscience. "304
This is not to say that religious leaders should remain pas-
sively silent either during the period leading up to hostilities or
during the military campaign itself.2 ° 5 Religious institutions serve
as a check on the power of secular leaders by publicly question-
ing the morality of impending military action. Religious leaders
302. Brinton, supra note 23, at B4.
303. Powers, supra note 270, at 206 ("In case of doubt the presumption
of right is in favor of legitimate authority."); cf. BYLER, supra note 49, at 37-38.
Martin Luther believed that Christians had a duty to obey the government
when ordered to fight "[u]nless, of course, one knows clearly that the war in
question is unjust." Id.
304. Edwin F. O'Brien, Messages: The Annunciation of the Lord (Mar.
25, 2003), at http://www.milarch.org/archbishop/obrien/hab030325.htm (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
305. "[O]nly the political authorities can make ... decisions [about
going to war], but that does not mean that the Church cedes its moral authority
to governments, or supinely rolls over or remains silent." Bruce Duncan, Iraqi
War: Opinion, THE CATHOLIC WEEKLY, Apr. 20, 2003, at 3, available at http://
www.catholicweekly.com.au/03/apr/20/18.html (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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should educate laypersons about the just war criteria and spark a
serious, educated debate about whether a nation should go to
war. Further, after hostilities have commenced, the clergy has an
appropriate role in encouraging, and monitoring, the lawful and
moral conduct of the war. Further, an individual's decision
whether to participate in a particular war should not be made
lightly; it must be an educated one. The decision should be
based upon all reasonably available information, made after con-
sulting relevant religious literature and after having obtained the
benefit of clergy."0 6 As the Archdiocese for the Military Services
instructed Catholic members of the military: "[W] e are obligated
to form our consciences properly and in accord with the truth, as
it can be known to us."
30 7
V. How Do You FIGHT A JUST/UNJUST WAR?
Regardless of the legality or morality of a war, both the law
and the vast majority of religions demand that the war be fought
justly. Within this area lies the greatest overlap between the law
and religion. Of significance, this is the one area of both the law
and the just war doctrine for which individual members of the
armed forces may, and should, be held individually responsible.
As the President of the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops stated on the eve of the invasion of Iraq: "If the decision
to use military force is taken, the moral and legal constraints on
the conduct of war must be observed. This is expected of every
civilized nation. It surely is expected of ours."30 8
Albeit individual soldiers may not be able to fully judge the
justness of the war itself, nor be held responsible for fighting in a
war eventually determined to be unjust, they can more readily be
held accountable for their own conduct. After opining that indi-
viduals called upon by their country to fight in a war of aggres-
306. PRESBYTERIANS AND MILITARY SERVICE, supra note 2, at 3 ("We call
upon each church member, facing these choices, to inform and enliven her or
his conscience, using as resources the community of the Church, the counsel of
the clergy, the Bible, sacraments, and prayer as a means of grace, the Confes-
sions, statements, and traditions of the church, together with adequate informa-
tion on the facts of a particular war."); The Episcopal Church, The Episcopal
Church and Conscientious Objection to War, at http://www.ecusa.anglican.org/
5252-ENGHTM.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) ("Today, the Episcopal Church contin-
ues to maintain that all decisions regarding participation or non-participation
in war or the preparation for war be the fruit of mature and prayerful discern-
ment informed by scripture, theology, and relevant knowledge of history and
contemporary conditions.").
307. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 35, at 1.
308. USCCB Feb. 2003 Statement, supra note 119.
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sion should not be held criminally responsible for such conduct,
Judge Anderson in the post-WWII Krupp case nevertheless pos-
ited "that in performing such service as he is called upon to
render, a citizen is bound by the laws and customs of war and if
he violates them he is subject to indictment and punishment on
that ground."3" 9
There is less ambiguity as to what individual conduct is
legally impermissible. Some forms of misconduct are simply
wrong under any standard of behavior. Although military orders
generally enjoy a presumption of legality,"'0 a "patently illegal
order" enjoys no such presumption and must be disobeyed. 1
Examples of obviously illegal orders include directives to kill
unarmed noncombatants who pose no visible threat,312 to exe-
cute a detainee or prisoner of war,3 1 3 or to commit rape.3 14 Simi-
larly, Catholic Catechism 2312 posits that "In]on-combatants,
wounded soldiers, and prisoners must be respected and treated
humanely. "315
Further, since at least the end of World War II, international
law and American domestic military law have rejected superior
309. Krupp Case, supra note 178, at 449.
310. United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 106 (C.A.A.F. 2001) ("Orders are
clothed with an inference of lawfulness."); see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MAR-
TIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. V 14c(2) (a) (i) (2002 ed.) ("An order requiring the
performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is
disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate.") [hereinafter MCM].
311. United States v. Austin, 27 M.J. 227, 231-32 (C.M.A. 1988) ("'It is
a ... long-standing principle of military law that' an order from a known supe-
rior is presumed to be lawful unless 'palpably illegal on its face.'") (citations
omitted); MCM, supra note 310, 14c(2) (a) (i) (An order's inference of lawful-
ness "does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the
commission of a crime.").
312. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 29 (C.M.A. 1973) ("An order
to kill infants and unarmed civilians who were so demonstrably incapable of
resistance to the armed might of a military force as were those killed by Lieuten-
ant Calley is in my opinion, so palpably illegal . . ").
313. United States v. Griffen, 39 C.M.R. 586, 590 (A.B.R. 1968) (Order to
shoot unarmed, unresisting Vietnamese detainee, whose hands were tied
behind his back, was "palpably illegal."); see Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 25 ("Military law
has long held that the killing of an unresisting prisoner is murder.").
314. "Rape has been considered a war crime for centuries." Thom
Shanker, Sexual Violence, in CRIMES OF WAR 323 (1999); see Alexandra Stiglmayer,
Sexual Violence: Systematic Rape, in CRIMES OF WAR 327 (1999) ("Under the statute
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, a commander can be prosecuted for rapes commit-
ted by his subordinates if he ordered or aided and abetted the rapes . . ." or
knew or should have known of such misconduct and took inadequate steps to
prevent or punish it.).
315. CATEcisM, supra note 95, at 556.
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orders as a defense to clearly illegal orders.3 1 6 As the American
Military Tribunal noted in the post-WWII Einsatzgruppen case:
"The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automa-
ton. A soldier is a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is
not expected to respond, like a piece of machinery." '3 1 7
Similarly, the Catholic Church also rejects "blind obedience"
as an excuse for committing war crimes. Catholic Catechism
2313 states in part: "Actions deliberately contrary to the law of
nations and to its universal principles are crimes, as are the
orders that command such actions. Blind obedience does not
suffice to excuse those who carry them out. 3 18
However a fair amount of moral and legal ambiguity still sur-
rounds wartime conduct. The concept of "proportionality" is
largely ajudgment call. One prophylactic measure employed by
the U.S. military to meet its legal obligations is the judicious use
of judge advocates (military attorneys) when making targeting
decisions. These military lawyers "are integrated into military
planning and operations at all levels" and they review proposed
target lists to ensure that these targets "satisfy the definition of
military objective; that the means selected in attacking the target
be proportional to the military advantage gained; and that inci-
dental damage to civilians and their property be minimized. '3 19
316. W. Hayes Parks, A Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes, 149 MIL.
L. Rrv. 73, 79-81 (1995); seeU.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10,
The Law of Land Warfare, 509 (uly 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10] (Superior
orders does not constitute a defense to a war crime "unless [the soldier] did not
know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act
ordered was unlawful."). However, the fact that a soldier committed a war
crime pursuant to orders may be considered as a mitigating factor during sen-
tencing. FM 27-10, supra, 509(a). Superior orders may also serve as the basis
for jury nullification. See BELKNAP, supra note 291, at 226 ("[Dlespite the dic-
tates of international law and the army's own regulations, officers sitting as
jurors in such cases were likely to accept obedience to orders as a complete
defense."). Commentators anticipate superior orders defenses to be raised by
those soldiers charged with misconduct committed against detainees at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq. Roman Scarborough, Iraq Trials Expect 'Following Orders'
Defense, WASH. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at A9.
317. United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10,
at 470 (1950).
318. CATECHISM, supra note 95, at 557.
319. Col. Frederic L. Borch, Targeting After Kosovo: Has the Law Changed for
Strike Planners?, NAVAL WAR C. REX'., Spring 2003, at 64, 68; see also Lt. Col. James
K. Carberry & Scott Holcomb, Target Selection at CFLCC: A Layer's Perspective,
FIELD ARTILLERY, Mar.-June 2004, at 39 ("As a member of the targeting board,
the judge advocate helps the commander make the right decision by highlight-
ing and addressing important issues, such as military necessity, proportionality
and collateral damage.").
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Further, America's national, military, and religious leaders may
differ as to the morality of certain weapons. 3 20 However, Ameri-
can soldiers can safely presume that any weapon in our military
arsenal is legal because all weapons used by the U.S. armed
forces are subject to prior legal review.3 21
Responsible nations will seek to go to war for proper reasons
and then fight that war in a legal and restrained manner, to the
extent practicable. Both the concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in
bello determine whether the military campaign as a whole is ajust
one. However, the two concepts are analytically distinct, particu-
larly at the individual soldier's level. Soldiers are expected to
fightjustly even when participating in an unjust war. Conversely,
participation in a just war does not abrogate the soldier's obliga-
tion to fight that properly as well.
To illustrate, the United States' participation in the Korean
War was proper, both morally and legally. It should be consid-
ered a just war. However, poorly trained American soldiers were
found to have killed a large number of Korean civilians at No
Gun Ri during the early days of the Korean War.3 2 The miscon-
duct of these soldiers was both immoral and illegal. Isolated inci-
dents, such as No Gun Ri, however, would not cause the United
States' participation in the war itself to be deemed unjust. 3
320. See, e.g., USCCB Nov. 2002 Statement, supra note 146 ("The use of
anti-personnel landmines, cluster bombs and other weapons that cannot distin-
guish between soldiers and civilians, or between times of war and times of
peace, should also be avoided.").
321. Borch, supra note 319, at 78 n.17 ("[E]very weapon in the U.S.
inventory must be reviewed for legality under the law of war."); see U.S. Dep't. of
the Air Force, Policy Directive No. 51-4, Compliance with the Law of Armed
Conflict, 4 (Apr. 26, 1993) ("The Air Force will make sure all weapons it buys
or develops are consistent with international law, particularly [the Law of
Armed Conflict].").
322. Robert Bums, GIs Killed Civilians Without Orders, Clinton 'Regets' No
Gun Ri Deaths In Korean War, ARiz. REPUB., Jan. 12, 2001, at Al ("A joint U.S.-
South Korean statement said, 'In the desperate opening weeks of defensive
combat in the Korean War, U.S. soldiers killed or injured an unconfirmed num-
ber of Korean refugees the last week of July 1950 during a withdrawal under
pressure in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.'"). South Korean survivors allege that as
many as 400 Koreans were killed at No Gun Ri. Id. at A17. Retired Marine
Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, an official outside observer of the official
Army investigation into the incident, did not believe a war crime had been com-
mitted because "[w] hat took place at No Gun Ri was perceived by those on the
scene ... as a legitimate act of self-defense against infiltrators hiding among the
refugees." Bernard E. Trainor, The Anguish of Knowing What Happened at iVo Gun
Ri, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at Bi, B4.
323. Trainor, supra note 322, at B4 ("[Wie went to Korea in a just cause
and fought the war honorably, not withstanding the unfortunate incident at No
Gun Ri."); see also Regan, supra note 1, at 98 ("Isolated acts of unjust war con-
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In comparison, a historical example of an unjust war being
fought justly is Rommel's Afrika Corps during World War II.
German General Erwin Rommel has been characterized as "an
honorable man," who followed the law of war: "He fought a bad
war well, not only militarily but also morally." 2 4 Rommel
refused to follow Hitler's illegal orders,3 2 treated enemy prison-
ers well in accordance with the laws of war,32 6 and generally
fought his unjust war in accordance with the law of armed
conflict.
VI. THE LAW OF WAR AND DOMESTIC MILITARY LAW
The "law of war" refers to the legal constraints imposed on
warring forces by international treaties, primarily the Hague and
Geneva Conventions and portions of the Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, and by certain customary laws of warfare.327 A war
crime is simply any violation of the law of war.3 2 However, some
war crimes, such as "willful killing, torture or inhuman treat-
ment, including biological experiments" committed against
those persons entitled to protection under the Conventions, are
deemed "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions. 329 A signa-
tory to the Conventions is under an affirmative obligation to sup-
press grave breaches or, alternatively, to search out and
prosecute persons who committed or ordered such miscon-
duct.33 0 Additionally, most, if not all, countries possess domestic
laws that govern the conduct of their military forces.
duct, however morally reprehensible, will not render unjust a belligerent's oth-
erwise just cause."); accord COLE, supra note 38, at 124-25.
324. WALZER, supra note 104, at 38.
325. RONALD LEWIN, ROMMEL AS MILITARv COMMANDER 310-11 (1968) ("It
was Rommel who burned the Commando Order issued by Hitler on 28 October
1942, which laid down that all enemy soldiers encountered behind the German
line were to be killed at once, regardless of whether they landed from sea or
air.").
326. See Martin Blumenson, Romme, in HITTLER'S GENERALS 314 (Correlli
Barnet ed., 1989) ("In a total war fought savagely and brutally, he inspired
admiration for his treatment of prisoners.").
327. FM 27-10, supra note 316, 4, 8(b) (c); Carberry & Holcomb, supra
note 319, at 40. Although "[t]he United States has not ratified the Geneva
Protocols, [it] considers many sections to be legally binding as customary inter-
national law." Id. at 43 n.1.
328. LEwY, supra note 17, at 343 ("The term 'war crime' is the technical
expression for a violation of the law of war by any person, military or civilian;
every violation of the law of war is a war crime."); see also FM 27-10, supra note
316, 499.
329. FM 27-10, supra note 316, 502.
330. Id. 506.
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Generally, in addition to specific prohibitions of certain con-
duct, the law of war is premised on three basic principles that
govern the use of force during armed conflict.3 3" ' The first prin-
ciple is military necessity, which is "that principle which justifies
those measures not forbidden by international law which are
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the
enemy as soon as possible. '33 2 A critical qualifier to the notion of
military necessity is the restrictive language "not forbidden by
international law." To illustrate, a retreating military force may
be targeted and obliterated as a necessary step in ultimately
defeating the enemy. However, the enemy's civilian populace
may not be deliberately targeted as a means of breaking the
enemy's will, even if such attacks would likely contribute to the
successful conclusion of the war, because the targeting of civil-
ians is forbidden by international law.
The second principle regulating the conduct of war is
unnecessary suffering, which prohibits the use of "arms, projec-
tiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.
333
Examples of such prohibited weapons include dum-dum bullets,
which flatten upon impact and thus increase damage, and glass-
filled projectiles. 3 4 Additionally, using white phosphorous artil-
lery rounds on enemy soldiers solely to cause additional suffering
and placing feces on punji stakes merely to increase the risk of
infection serve as additional illustrations of weapons used in vio-
lation of this principle.
Finally, the principle of proportionality states that the "loss
of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to
the military advantage to be gained."33 5 For example, it would
violate this principle to destroy an entire village in order to sup-
press a single sniper.
Misconduct that qualifies as a war crime may be prosecuted
by international tribunals, the courts of conquering nations, or
by the soldiers' own judicial system. Following WWII, former
331. See The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, ADI-1, The
Basic Course, International Law Deskbook 2-2 (Oct. 1988) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Law Deskbook].
332. FM 27-10, supra note 316, 3a; International Law Deskbook, supra
note 331, at 2-2.
333. FM 27-10, supra note 316, 34a; International Law Deskbook, supra
note 331, at 2-2.
334. FM 27-10, supra note 316, 34a.
335. Id. 41; see also Carberry & Holcomb, supra note 319, at 40 ("[T he
principle of proportionality requires that the anticipated loss of civilian life and
damage to civilian property, or collateral damage, incidental to attacks not be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to
be gained.").
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members of the German armed forces were subject to prosecu-
tion by a variety ofjudicial bodies. Major Nazi war criminals were
prosecuted before the international military tribunal at Nurem-
berg. 36 Additionally, military tribunals in the American, British,
French, and Soviet zones of occupation carried out prosecutions
against a significant number of lesser military officials.3 37 The
courts of other countries also conducted criminal proceedings
against the Germans, including Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
Israel.33 Finally, to its credit, the Federal Republic of Germany
also prosecuted its nationals for various war-related crimes. 3
Similarly, Japanese military officials were called to task for
their war-time misconduct. The Supreme Allied Commander,
General Douglas MacArthur, established the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE"), which was composed of
judges from the United States and its wartime allies. 4 ' The
IMTFE arraigned twenty-eight high-ranking military and civilian
leaders, eventually sentencing seven to death, sixteen to incarcer-
ation for life, and the remaining two to prison terms of twenty
336. ADALBERT RucV RiL, THE INVESTIGATION OF NAZi CRIMES 1945-1978,
at 24 (1979). Initially twenty-four Germans were to stand trial, but a suicide(Dr. Robery Ley) and a determination that one defendant was unfit to stand
trial (Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach) reduced the number in the
docket to twenty-two. Id. at 24-25. Of those defendants, three were acquitted.
Id. at 26.
337. Id. at 26-31. The American military tribunals charged 1,941 individ-
uals, of which 1,517 were convicted and sentenced, 367 acquitted, and 57 had
their charges dropped against them. Id. at 28-29. The British tried 1,085
Germans by military tribunal in Germany, Italy, and Belgium. Id. at 29. The
French convicted 2,107 Germans in Germany, of which the majority were asso-
ciated with the concentration camps, and sentenced at least another 1,918
Germans in France or French North Africa. Id. at 29. No accurate records of
Soviet prosecutions exist, but German records indicate that more than 13,000
Germans were serving tribunal-rendered sentences as of May 1950. Id.
338. Id. at 31. Israel captured, tried, and executed former SS officer
Adolph Eichman in 1962. Id.
339. West Germany's Federal Ministry of Justice reported at least 6,440
persons were convicted of "Nazi crimes and war crimes" and received "non-
appealable sentences by the end of 1978." Id. at 117. But cf. MAGUIRE, supra
note 133, at 285 ("Between 1958 and the end of 1985, West German courts
convicted 992 Germans for war time atrocities. However, many of the sentences
were extremely lenient.").
340. MAcuiRE, supra note 133, at 131-32. In addition to the United
States, the allied countries participating included Australia, Canada, China,
France, the Philippines, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, and India. Id. at 132. MacArthur made the unilateral decision not to
prosecute Emperor Hirohito and selected the presidingjudge, William Webb of
Australia. Id.
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and seven years, respectively. 3 " Lesser military officials, catego-
rized as class B and C war criminals, were prosecuted by Allied
countries throughout Asia and the Pacific. By April 1951,
approximately 5,700 Japanese, Formosan, and Korean alleged
war criminals were prosecuted, of which 984 were sentenced to
death, 475 to incarceration for life, and 2,944 to prison terms of
various lengths. 4 2 American military courts were responsible for
prosecuting almost 1,300 Japanese military personnel for war
crimes.3
4 3
The American military prosecutes its service members for
misconduct that violates the laws of war under our own domestic
military law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 34 4 For exam-
ple, during the Vietnam War the United States followed that pol-
icy,345 albeit with mixed results. War crimes committed by
American service members are believed to have been underre-
ported,3 4 6 difficult to prove under combat conditions,
3 4 7 and
judged by fellow soldiers who were sometimes sympathetic to the
accused.348 Of 241 reported allegations of war crimes committed
by members of the U.S. Army in Vietnam between 1965 and
1975, seventy-eight were considered to be substantiated after a
finding of probable cause by Army investigators, but of those
341. MAGUIRE, supra note 133, at 191, 361 n.234. Five of the prisoners
died; the remainder were all released by 1958. Id. at 361 n.234.
342. YuKI TANAKA, HIDDEN HoRRORs: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD
WAR II 2 (1996); see GAVAN DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE JAPANESE: POWs OF WORLD
WAR II IN THE PACIFIC 370 (1994) (stating that, of the more than 5,700 members
of the Japanese armed forces prosecuted for war crimes, some 3,000 were con-
victed and 920 were executed). However, of those Japanese convicted and sen-
tenced to confinement, the longest sentence actually served was less than
thirteen years; all Japanese war criminals were released by December 1958. Id.
at 373.
343. MAGUIRE, supra note 133, at 134.
344. FM 27-10, supra note 316, 507(b).
345. See LT. COL. GARY D. SoIs, MARINES AND MILITARY LAW IN VIETNAM:
TRIAL BY FIRE 32-33 (1989) ("No Marine was charged with the commission of a
war crime, as such, in Vietnam. Rather, any 'violations of the law of war' com-
mitted by a Marine against a Vietnamese was charged as a violation of the
UCMJ.").
346. LEwy, supra note 17, at 345-46. Although probably underreported,
war crimes committed by American military personnel in Vietnam never rose to
the levels claimed by some critics of our participation in the war.
347. For a discussion of the difficulty in proving a war crime at trial while
in a war zone, see generally GARY D. SOLIs, SON THANG: AN AMERICAN WAR
CRIME (1997).
348. Cf BELKNAP, supra note 291, at 225 (stating that former Army prose-
cutor William Eckhardt opined "most military men believed that a conviction in
a My Lai case would be a 'slap in the face of the army' and would undermine
the war effort.").
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only thirty-six were referred to a court-martial and only twenty
cases resulted in a conviction.34 9
Another possible avenue to prosecute war crimes is the War
Crimes Act of 1996.350 This Act extends federal criminal jurisdic-
tion to both members of the armed forces and to U.S. nationals
who commit war crimes "inside or outside the United States."351
War crimes are defined as (1) a "grave breach" of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 or any protocol to those conventions to
which the United States is a party; (2) conduct prohibited by cer-
tain provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907; (3) violations
of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (or sub-
sequent protocols to which the United States becomes a party) in
cases on non-international armed conflict; and (4) willfully caus-
ing death or serious injury to civilians in violation of the Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices. 52
The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 was
enacted to fill a jurisdictional void over certain categories of peo-
ple who committed crimes overseas while "employed by or
accompanying" United States forces. 53 The Act gives the United
States jurisdiction over the largest body of civilians accompanying
U.S. forces into combat with increasing regularity-civilian con-
tractors. With the recent amendments of section 1088 of the
Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005, H.R. 4200, jurisdiction now extends to the Depart-
ment of Defense ("DoD") civilian employees and civilian employ-
ees of other federal agencies supporting DoD overseas;
contractors, subcontractors, and their employees, employed on a
DoD contract or on a contract of an agency supporting DoD
349. LEWY, supra note 17, at 348. Soldiers were convicted of such crimes
as murder or manslaughter (nine), rape (three), mistreatment of prisoners of
war or detainees (three), and mutilation (five). Id.
350. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
351. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)-(b). In the wake of the Abu Ghraib detainee
abuse scandal, "[fifteen] House Democrats wrote to Attorney GeneralJohn Ash-
croft demanding appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate whether
administration officials violated the War Crimes Act 'by approving the use of
torture techniques banned by international law.'" Jess Bravin, Abuse Scandal
Stalls Judicial Nominee, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2004, at A4.
352. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c).
353. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3261 (a) (1) (West Supp. 2004). For a discussion of the
Act and its development see generally Michael J. Davidson & Robert Korroch,
Extending Military Jurisdiction to American Contractors Overseas, 35 PROCUREMENT L.
1 (2000); Captain Glenn R. Schmitt, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act:
The Continuing Problem of Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the
Armed Forces-Problem Solved?, AsM L., Dec. 2000, at 1.
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overseas; and their family members (dependents), if working or
residing overseas and not a national of the host country.3 5 4
Additionally, the Act permits the prosecution of soldiers who
had committed crimes, such as war crimes, but who had left the
military before the crimes had come to light or had been ade-
quately investigated and were beyond the reach of military law.35 5
However, the Act's scope does not extend to civilian employees
and contractors of other agencies, such as the CIA, or to mem-
bers of the media, such as the embedded journalists who traveled
with U.S. forces during the initial invasion of Iraq. The Act may
see its first application as a result of reported detainee abuse at
the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.3 56
Finally, the 2001 USA Patriot Act3" 7 expanded the overseas
criminal jurisdiction of the United States. Section 804 of the Act
amended Title 18 of the United States Code to provide for juris-
diction over U.S. nationals who commit, or are the victim of,
crimes that occur overseas on "the premises of United States dip-
lomatic, consular, military or other United States Government
missions or entities .... ,,358 The Department ofJustice relied on
this provision to charge a CIA contractor with assault after he
allegedly beat a detainee in Afghanistan. 9
VII. THE JUST WAR PRINCIPLES
The just war tradition embraces two primary principles limit-
ing the use of force: discrimination, also called "noncombatant
immunity," and proportionality. 6 These principles are similar
354. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3267(1), (2) (West Supp. 2004).
355. Id. § 3261 (d) (1). Additionally, active duty members of the military
fall within the scope of this Act if the United States charges at least two people
with a crime, at least one of whom is not in the military. Id. § 3261(d) (2).
356. Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Ashcroft Says U.S. Can Prosecute Civilian
Contractors for Prison Abuse, WASH. POST, May 7, 2004, at A18.
357. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT ACT].
358. Id. § 804(a) (amendment codifying 18 U.S.C. § 7(9)).
359. Department of Justice News Release, CIA Contractor Indicted for
Assaulting Detainee Held at U.S. Base in Afghanistan (June 17, 2004), available
at http://wAw.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2O04/June/O4_crm_414.htm (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) ("The USA PATRIOT
ACT of 2001 gives the United States jurisdiction in the Passaro case."). The CIA
contractor is "the first civilian to face criminal charges related to U.S. treatment
of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq." CIA Contractor Indicted in Prisoner's Death,
WASH. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A3.
360. Regan, supra note 1, at 87, 95; see also Pastoral Message, supra note
86, at 4 ("Even if the cause is just, the grave moral obligation to respect the
principles of non-combatant immunity and proportionality remains in force
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to, and derived from, the international law of armed conflict.
The principle of discrimination holds that: 'Just warriors may
directly target personnel participating in the enemy's wrongdo-
ing but should not directly target other enemy nationals."36 '
"[C]ivilians may not be the object of direct attack and military
personnel must take due care to avoid and minimize indirect
harm to civilians. '5 62
The principle of proportionality states that "in the conduct
of hostilities, efforts must be made to attain military objectives
with no more force than is militarily necessary and to avoid dis-
proportionate collateral damage to civilian life and property. "363
If the loss of innocent life and/or destruction of property is
grossly out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained,
the just warrior must alter the military strategy. 36 4
A recent articulation of the just war theory includes a mental
component to the just conduct analysis. The U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops takes the position that combatants act with the
right intention, that is "even in the midst of conflict, the aim of
political and military leaders must be peace with justice, so that
acts of vengeance and indiscriminate violence, whether by indi-
viduals, military units or governments, are forbidden." '36 5
The Islamic tradition has also embraced the principles of
discrimination and proportionality.3 6 6 The Prophet reportedly
would instruct his commanders to adhere to certain restraints
and must govern our nation's political and military decisions."); McCormick,
supra note 90, at 804 ("The principles detailing the limits of force in defensive
action are two: the immunity of noncombatants and the general principle of
proportionality."); DAVIS, supra note 48, at 236 ("Once war has been entered
into, the jus in bello criteria include a principle of proportionality ... and the
principle of discrimination . . ").
361. REGAN, supra note 1, at 87.
362. Pastoral Message, supra note 86, Appendix; see also DAvis, supra note
48, at 236 ("[D]irect, intentional attacks on non-combatants are prohibited.");
COLE, supra note 38, at 95 ("[N]o innocent people are to be targeted
intentionally.").
363. Pastoral Message, supra note 86, Appendix; see also DAVIs, supra note
48, at 236 ("the use of force and violence must be limited in terms of legitimate
military necessity .... ").
364. See COLE, supra note 38, at 101 ("If our strategy demands, even indi-
rectly, the lives of too many innocent people, we have to create another
strategy.").
365. Pastoral Message, supra note 86, Appendix; see also Harvest ofJustice,
supra note 89.
366. Sohail H. Hashmi, Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace, in
THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 146, 161 (1996) ("Thus, the Qur'an and the
actions of the Prophet and his successors established the principles of discrimi-
nation and proportionality of means.").
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during their military campaigns. 367 Further, the Qur'an, which
serves as the basis for Islamic just conduct in war, provides: "And
fight in God's cause against those who wage war against you, but
do not transgress limits, for God loves not the transgressors. "'368
The first caliph, Abu Bakr, forbad mutilation, the killing of
women, children, and old men, and unnecessary destruction (of
palm trees, fruit trees, and animals) .3" Early Islamic jurists
placed limitations on the conduct of warfare, to include prohibit-
ing attacks upon women and children and limiting the destruc-
tion of property to that necessary for military victory.
370
CONCLUSION
The just war doctrine is an imperfect attempt to place con-
straints on warfare and warriors. In many cases, it has merely
served as a speed bump on the road to war. However, history has
yet to produce a better mechanism for injecting moral reflection
into the real politik decision-making that has historically charac-
terized the decision to commit military forces. In western liberal
democracies, particularly the United States, this moral calculus
does have some influence on the decision-making process either
directly on the decision-makers themselves or indirectly through
the influence of public opinion. In the words of one ethicist,
'Just war thinking imposes constraints where they might not oth-
erwise exist; generates a debate that might not otherwise occur;
and promotes skepticism and uneasiness about the use and abuse
of power without opting out of political reality altogether in favor
of utopian fantasies and projects."3 7 '
Religious figures who publicly challenge America's participa-
tion in military operations must be aware that their conduct has
consequences. Members of the clergy do not pontificate from
their pulpits, or in the media, in a vacuum. Practicing members
367. Id. ("According to authoritative traditions, whenever the Prophet
sent out a military force, he would instruct its commander to adhere to certain
restraints.").
368. Hashmi, supra note 366, at 161 (citing Qur'an 2:190). According to
Koranic scholar Barbara Stowasser of Georgetown University, this passage
"means using only the 'absolute minimum of destruction."' Bill Broadway, Look-
ingfor Answers in Islam's Holy Book, WASH. PosT, Sept. 29, 2001, at B9.
369. Hashmi, supra note 366, at 161 (citation omitted); see also Broadway,
supra note 368, at B9 ("Abu Bakr, the first caliph, or great Muslim leader, after
Muhammad's death in 632, instructed his soldiers 'not to deviate from the right
path,' which included not killing women, children, or old men, and not muti-
lating dead bodies.").
370. Id. at 162. However, women and children were still subject to
enslavement and ransom. Id.
371. Elshtian, supra note 94, at 23.
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of their faiths will give great weight to the opinions of clergy
when discussing the justness of a war, and this is no less true of
religious members of the armed forces and their families.
This is not to suggest that the clergy have no right to pub-
licly protest, because in this country, with our democratic system
of government and constitutional right to free speech, that right
is certainly secure. Nor do I suggest that they should not scruti-
nize America's participation in its wars-indeed, given the
nature of their profession they would be expected to do so.
Although the evaluation of the moral basis for military action
ultimately resides with secular public authorities, the Church
should educate the public about the criteria for making such
momentous decisions and participate in the national debate
leading to the commitment of military forces. When factual and
moral clarity exists, the Church may also opine on the justness of
a particular commitment of force.
However, religious leaders should proceed cautiously when
it comes to actions directly affecting the individual soldier, giving
great deliberation to such conduct. One of the many lessons that
this nation learned in the wake of Vietnam is that regardless of
one's position on the legitimacy, legality, or wisdom of a particu-
lar military campaign, the individual soldiers called upon to fight
in that campaign should not be the object of the emotional
wrath of opponents to it. Opponents of military action should
limit themselves to condemning the war, but not the warriors, so
long as they fight it properly. The moral and legal consequences
of initiating a questionable, or unjust, war properly is borne by
those high-ranking government officials who ultimately are
responsible for such military action, and not by the common sol-
dier who is charged with executing that decision. This lesson
appears to have been recognized by both the American people 372
and the clergy, in the United States3 73 and abroad .1 4
372. JAMES KITFIELD, PRODIGAL SOLDIERS: How THE GENERATION OF
OFFICERS BORN OF VIETNAM REVOLUTIONIZED THE AMERICAN STYLE OF WAR 377
(1995) (During the Christmas season preceding Operation Desert Storm,
American service members in South West Asia received "letters from people
who said they couldn't support a war, yet who backed heart and soul the service
members who might be asked to fight it. Perhaps most important, there were
so many Americans who now understood the difference.").
373. See USCCB Feb. 2003 Statement, supra note 119, at 3 ("Our hearts
and prayers go out especially to those who may bear the burden of these terri-
ble choices-the men and women of our armed forces and their families ... ").
374. In his post-invasion sermon, Australian Phillip Jensen, dean of Saint
Andrew's Anglican Cathedral, admonished: "[W]e must not attack the service-
men and servicewomen who, obedient to the duly elected government of the
day, are willing to lay down their lives to protect our freedom, including our
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Further, the decision whether or not the individual soldier
should participate in a particular military campaign must be an
educated one, achieved after gathering all available facts and
after seeking the advice and guidance of clergy. However, to the
extent a service member bears the responsibility of making such
educated decisions, the clergy's obligation to self-educate before
taking a public position on the morality of a specific campaign is
particularly acute. More importantly, the election to declare a
war unjust, and to forbid the participation of members of the
military, with all the associated ramifications visited upon the
morally responsible soldier who elects to comply with such an
edict, should be made under only the most compelling, and
clear-cut, circumstances. Given the lack of factual clarity sur-
rounding most military campaigns, and the continuing lack of
consensus among some of the best legal and religious minds in
the nation concerning the legality and justness of such controver-
sial wars as Vietnam and Operation Iraqi Freedom, dispositive
declarations that a particular military action is unjust, with a con-
comitant prohibition against participating in it, should be a vir-
tual rarity. Ultimately, the decision as to the justness of a
particular military campaign, and the appropriateness of partici-
pating in it, should be a matter left to the individual's con-
science-a matter between the soldier and his or her God.
freedom to dissent from government opinion." Phillip Jensen, Apocalypse Again
and Again, CHRISTANITY TODAY, May 2003, at 34.
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